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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF CIVILIAN STUDIES  
AND THE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION  
OF THE NAVY'S OFFICE OF INFORMATION

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ROBERT S. JONES



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BOSTON UNIVERSITY

School of Public Relations and Communications

Thesis

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF CIVILIAN STUDIES AND THE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION  
OF THE NAVY'S OFFICE OF INFORMATION

By

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"Public support is essential--with it nothing can fail, without it nothing can succeed."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Public relations as a recognized science is a product of the twentieth century. But the exercise of public relations dates back into ancient history.

As early as 490 B.C. one is told of the battle of Marathon where 10,000 Athenians defeated the hitherto undefeated Persian Army. Pheidippides, the great Greek athlete, ran some 28 miles from Marathon to Athens to carry the news of the victory to the anxious Athenians. Although he dropped dead upon arrival, he had instilled in the spirits of the Athenians undreamed of prestige.

Yet, ancient as is the practice of public relations, the military forces of this nation have actively pursued it in an organized fashion only during the past two decades.

For the first few years of what might be called the "modern period" of military public relations, it was confined to the servicing of news about World War II. It was not until the hostilities ceased that any great thought was given to a permanent organization and a continuing program.



## I. CIVILIAN STUDIES

To set the guidelines for these permanent programs, civilian public relations experts were called upon--persons who had no service connections and who could take a detached view--persons, who, through training and experience, could set up the best possible criteria for grading military information.

Three such studies were conducted on navy information. These were preceded by a study on Army information--and followed by one of the Defense Department program.

These studies were submitted, approved, and certain elements implemented.

## II. THE PROBLEM

No one, however, has ever attempted to ascertain in what areas these reports overlapped and in which fields they were in disagreement. And, more importantly, no one has related a consensus of these recommendations to the Navy's information program and organization. In this paper that will now be done.

## III. PUBLIC RELATIONS SIGNIFICANCE

The thesis will discuss and ascertain the mission for Navy information and public relations in this nuclear age--and how this mission and the public information organization has developed.





Twenty years ago the Navy's Office of Information did not exist, its birth coming shortly before Pearl Harbor. The first mission of this new organization was keeping the public informed of naval activities during the "neutrality war" of 1941, followed by, of course, the fortunes of warfare after December 7, 1941.

By 1952, the mission of the Navy informational program had evolved, according to the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, into:

Inform the public and the naval service concerning the Navy as an instrument of national policy and security, and, the activities of the Navy, as compatible with military security, and, the responsibilities and participation of naval personnel as United States citizens under the American concept of government and society.<sup>1</sup>

Today, keeping the public informed is still the backbone of navy information. But keeping them informed of what: deterrent forces, retaliatory strength, the need for seapower, guided missiles, earth satellites?

And, today, the mission of navy information cannot be limited to just keeping the public informed. For today military strength is all encompassing--it is not confined to liberty ports and training stations. Today there are jets screaming overhead, Nike batteries in backyards, satellites gliding across the skies. Community relations have taken on new significance.

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<sup>1</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 3.



Today, also, highly trained technicians must be kept in the Navy to man the intricate mechanisms that release the new nuclear weapons. So, internal relations have taken on new significance.

And, finally, to keep this vast new project of navy information functioning proficiently, a potent personnel program must be developed within the public information field.

The new mission for navy information must include, therefore, keeping the public informed, community relations, internal relations and personnel planning. And, everywhere the basic mission of the Navy must be understood.

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF AREA TO BE STUDIED

Five civilian studies of military information were used in this thesis. These were supplemented by a Navy-civilian study and a book on Marine Corps information.

In addition, research delved into testimony by the Chiefs of Information before congressional committees--as such testimony pertained to the subject. It was not the aim of this thesis, however, to go into the Congressional aspects of the public information programs as that has been the subject of a thesis by Lieutenant Commander Robert P. Brett, USN.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Robert P. Brett, "A Study of Current Congressional Opinion on Military Information Practices and Policies (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, Boston, 1958).



Interviews were also conducted with Mr. Laurence O. Pratt--author of two of the studies--and with Rear Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, USN, until recently the Navy Chief of Information. Conferences were conducted, in addition, with staff members of the Offices of Information of the Department of Defense, Navy, Army and Air Force.

## V. METHODS USED

Library research and research concerning the civilian reports mentioned above were accomplished as well as the oral interviews with the individuals also previously stated.

## VI. THE APPROACH

In order to fully understand the significance of the current and proposed mission and organization for Navy information and public relations, it is necessary to first define what public relations and public information are. Second, the reader should be made aware of the development of military information throughout the history of the United States. The next section of this thesis, therefore, will trace the family tree of military information with particular emphasis on the Navy.

Inasmuch as the Navy's information program must be closely related to the Navy's mission itself, there will be a discussion of the New Nuclear Navy.



One last preparatory chapter is necessary prior to the study of the civilian reports. This will outline and discuss the current mission and organization of the Navy information program.

Following this, the recommendations of the civilian studies will be examined. The paper will be limited to the areas covered by the studies. However, occasionally recommendations of the author will be added, if appropriate.

Each of these recommendations will be related to the mission for Navy information in the nuclear age.

Not every one of the recommendations made in the civilian studies will be listed. This is for two reasons: first, several are no longer pertinent; and, second, many have already been implemented by the Navy. Several of the recommendations will be discussed under two or more headings. For example, inspections of reserve public relations activities will be discussed under "public relations of the reserve" and under "plans and inspections."

The end result of this thesis is to outline the recommendations of the civilian studies which should--or should not--be implemented and their relationship to the Navy's informational program and organization.

First, however, it is necessary to define public relations and other related terms.





## VII. DEFINITIONS

To eliminate confusion which might arise by certain terms germane to military information, the following terms are defined:

1650 specialist - The Navy uses a "number series" to define the prime qualifications of its officers. A 1650 would be a regular Navy public information specialist who would at all times be assigned to a public information billet.

PIO specialist - the same.

1655 specialist - the same, except a naval reserve officer.

PIO - short for public information officer

Journalist - an enlisted man--or woman--who, as a petty officer, is rated in the enlisted PIO category.

Chief of Information - The Admiral in charge of naval information.

CHINFO - short for Chief of Information; or, for the Office of Information.

Department of the Navy - all naval ships, stations, bureaus and offices.

Navy Department - the bureaus and offices comprising the Washington headquarters.



## CHAPTER II

### PUBLIC RELATIONS

#### I. DEFINITION

A study of twelve public relations books reveals a dozen definitions of public relations. None conflict. But neither are two alike. For public relations is defined by what it accomplishes, how it accomplishes, and by what people think it should accomplish.

The extent of this confusion and perhaps even the danger of it is illustrated by a survey in which 2,000 of the leading public relations executives and practitioners of the country submitted their definitions of public relations. As reported by Glenn and Denny Griswold:<sup>1</sup>

A wide variety of concepts were revealed by replies which characterized public relations as a science, a system, an art, a process, a function, a relationship, a humanizing genius, a term, a business, a profession, a method, an activity, a program, a pattern of behavior, a morale force, a combination of media, et cetera.

The top three definitions were chosen by a committee. The first place award was assigned to the definition submitted by J. C. Seidel, public relations director, Division of Housing, State of New York. It was:

Public relations is the continuing process by which management endeavors to obtain the goodwill and understanding of its customers, its employees and the public at large; inwardly through self-analysis and correction, outwardly through all means of expression.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Glenn Griswold and Denny Griswold (ed.), Your Public Relations (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1948), p. 4

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



The third place winner, however, is better for adapting to the Navy program:

Public relations is the art of bringing about public understanding which breeds greater public confidence for any individual or organization.<sup>3</sup>

## II. PUBLIC RELATIONS INSPIRES CONFIDENCE

The American public has always been suspicious of big organizations concerning which they know little. Constant derogatory references to "Pentagon Brass" and the Pentagon, in general, can in the long run reduce the nation's confidence in its military leadership. Therefore, military public relations must stimulate public understanding in order to cultivate better public confidence.

Canfield states public relations is, first, a philosophy of management--an attitude of mind which places the interest of people first in all matters pertaining to the conduct of the organization.<sup>4</sup> But it is not only a philosophy and function of management, it is also a technique of communication through which the public learns about the aims and accomplishments of an organization--namely, the Navy.

The growth of this new profession has paralleled the recognition by influential men everywhere that no power can

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Bertrand R. Canfield, Public Relations, Principles, Cases, and Problems (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 5



survive unless it has the support of the public. The day when tyrants and tycoons said "the public be damned" is gone.<sup>5</sup>

### III. OTHER TERMS

Many confuse public relations with publicity, press agency, propaganda, and advertising. They think of the PR man as one who is constantly thinking up stunts to gain free publicity. Many an extravaganza has been termed "just another public relations stunt."

Cutlip and Center differentiate between the terms as follows:<sup>6</sup>

Publicity: the dissemination of information making matters public from the point of view of one who wishes to inform others. Systematic distribution of information about an institution or an individual.

Press agency: creation of publicity-worthy events and the use of brass bands and barkers, if necessary, to attract attention to some person or some thing.

Propaganda: the organized, systematic spreading of a doctrine or the propagation of an idea or a cause.

Advertising: the purchase of space in print or time on the air to promote the sale of products, the acceptance of ideas, or to build institutional good will and prestige. Paid publicity.

The public relations program of the Navy could be said to include all of these. For the Navy disseminates information; it creates publicity-worthy events such as the

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<sup>5</sup>Theodore R. Sills and Philip Lesley, Public Relations (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1946), p. 3

<sup>6</sup>Scott M. Cutlip & Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1952), p. 6





International Naval Review; spreads the doctrine of a strong naval force; and it uses advertising in recruiting drives.

But they are not public relations. They are merely the means to the end. Harlan and Scott perhaps have the shortest definition of public relations. They state it "is the art of making friends."<sup>7</sup>

#### IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION

There is one other term which must be defined before any discussion of navy public relations. That is "public information."

In 1949, the armed forces changed their "public relations officers" into "public information officers."

Congress has defined public information as "the act or process of communicating knowledge, to enlighten."<sup>8</sup>

The question arises as to where public information fits into the public relations program? It is an adjunct to public relations.

A former commandant of the Armed Forces Information School, Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, USN, stated:<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Gene Harlan & Alan Scott, Contemporary Public Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 4

<sup>8</sup>Richard M. McCool, Jr. & John M. Stevens, "An Analysis and Evaluation of the Relationship Between Civilian Navy-Interest Groups and the Navy's Public Information Program" (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, Boston, 1955), p. 2

<sup>9</sup>Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, USN, "Press Relations" (paper read at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, February 12, 1953), p. 5



Public information and public relations are distinct subjects, but they are not separated. It is one of the hand maidens of the policy and program. Public information is just one of the tools through which one can develop and maintain good public relations. Public relations and public information are not synonymous.

To conclude, let it be said that public relations covers a broad field of which publicity and public information are important aspects.



## CHAPTER III

### MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS

Public relations has been defined. The next goal is to ascertain why the military forces of the United States need public relations.

The armed services comprise America's biggest business. It may be compared to a great national corporation owned by 160 million stockholders who have invested billions of their dollars in equipping and operating this enterprise.

Just as a corporation is accountable to its owners for the way their money is spent and their business is run, the armed forces must report fully and promptly on its affairs to the public.

"Public relations provides the taxpayer with a balance sheet of his investment," says a former Navy Chief of Information. "The military do that through various programs which the taxpayer can evaluate and decide whether he's getting his money's worth."<sup>1</sup>

Also, being a democracy, the government cannot cloak its operations in secrecy. Adequate information as to its activities must be given to its citizens or the foundation of its democracy will be eaten away.

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<sup>1</sup>Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, "The Increasing Importance of Sea Power (Public Relations)" (paper read at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, October 7, 1957), p. 2.



Keeping the public informed of how his defense dollar is being spent, therefore, is a prime requirement of military public relations. But there is another responsibility.

## I. PAST HISTORY

History has twice proved that failure to keep the American public and the members of the military establishment properly informed, through an adequate public relations program concerning the hazards of one-sided disarmament, results in a breakdown of provisions "for common defense."

Pratt reports that:<sup>2</sup>

After World War I and World War II, an uninformed public demanded that we demobilize. By yielding as we must in a democracy to popular demand, we opened the door to aggression, lost thousands of American lives, and unnecessarily prolonged hostilities with all its tragic consequences.

Therefore, to prevent this occurring again, the armed services must maintain their "defenses" in this field of public relations with the same skill that they devote to land, sea and air power.

## II. THE SCOPE OF MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS

President Eisenhower said a few years ago:<sup>3</sup>

We of the Army have been lagged in our awareness of public relations. This attitude perhaps dates from the

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<sup>2</sup>Laurence O. Pratt, "Recommendations for Defense Department Public Relations," (unpublished report, Washington, D. C., 1955), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Cited by Cutlip, op. cit., p. 417.





era of the Indian Wars, when the Army was stationed in isolated outposts, and the military were a class unto themselves. I can still recall when I first heard the term "public relations officer." So far as I could see the job generally consisted of scaring up a couple of photographers and perhaps inviting an editor to the post in the hope that he would write a nice story.

Unfortunately, many senior military officers still think of public relations in this manner. They fail to realize that publicity is just a means to an end--and that the crux of the matter is whether or not the military has been conducting itself in a manner conducive to good public opinion.

Lockhart, in his report on the Army information warns that a military service is only as good publicly as it is in reality. He states:<sup>4</sup>

If the Army is good, the story will be good--and public relations will be good. If the Army is bad, the story will be bad and the results bad. In the end, public opinion about the Army reflects what the Army itself is.

This truth is difficult for some Army personnel to realize and accept. They want the Army to be an ideal Army, a perfect Army, in the public mind, no matter what it may be in actuality.

In other words, regardless of the caliber of the public relations program, the end result can be no better than the product itself.

To help improve that product, is another responsibility of military public relations. The military public relations

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<sup>4</sup>Jack H. Lockhart, "The Lockhart Report" (War Department, 1946, Reprinted by the Army Information School, Fort Slocum, New York, 1955), p. 2



officer must constantly tell his commander the influence contemplated actions will have on public opinion.

### III. DEFINING MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS

Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, when he was Chief of Naval Operations, defined military public relations as:<sup>5</sup>

Military public relations is the business of maintaining mutually satisfactory understanding between the military and civilian community. It transcends the simple mechanics of telling the people about land, air and sea power. It is a reciprocal process involving every aspect of human conduct in the field of human relations. It involves community relations. It involves internal understandings.

Certainly before anything external can be accomplished, military people must know and understand their own particular service.

The men and women in uniform are conspicuous individuals because they, like the weapons they operate, represent a public trust.

No public action of the individual, nothing he writes or says to the public, goes unnoticed. And, I might add, that sometimes the line between private relations and public relations is a thin one indeed, and it is a line that is constantly changing.

Something that might appear to have only private significance today might eventually be of public interest, and, of course, the foundation of military public relations is public welfare.

This, then, is the reason for public relations in the military. The people of the United States are requested to support a large and expensive military establishment. The

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<sup>5</sup>Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, "Military Public Relations" (paper read before the Public Relations Society of America, New York, New York, May 5, 1954), p. 3.



armed forces are making a heavy drain on the nation's wealth, manpower and natural resources. It is mandatory, therefore, that the armed forces create public understanding of their mission. No organization faces a stiffer public relations assignment.



## CHAPTER IV

### HISTORY OF NAVAL INFORMATION

"To know nothing of the past," said an ancient philosopher, "is to understand little of the present and to have no conception of the future."<sup>1</sup>

It was felt, therefore, that a resume of naval information history should be included in this study. Unlike naval operations, however, informational programs have not been detailed for posterity by the historians. But it has been possible to trace their development throughout the years.

#### I. THE REVOLUTION

Although the concept of public information in the armed forces today is comparatively new, the practice of it has been with the services since the Revolution. Leading the troops was a man who was very sensitive to public opinion--George Washington.

An example of the problems facing General Washington occurred in Norfolk in 1778. The French Admiral D'Estane had a fleet in the harbor with four thousand Marines aboard. The strategy of the day called for the fleet to put to sea. The Colonists, thinking the French were fleeing,

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<sup>1</sup>John Hammerton (ed.), The New Illustrated World History, (New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., Inc. 1947), p. v.





called them cowards. So, Washington had his committee on correspondence get out the word by letter and by mouth that the withdrawal was a military necessity, thus redeeming the French in the eyes of the Colonists.<sup>2</sup>

Washington was fortunate to have a man working for him whom is referred to as the first professional public information officer (PIO). With a powerful pen, Thomas Paine served General Washington at every critical turn of events.

## II. THE EARLY YEARS

In the earliest days of the Republic, the Navy was small, weak and generally neglected. On several occasions disaster was narrowly averted because Americans as a group were even more ignorant of the importance of sea power than they are today.<sup>3</sup>

## III. THE WAR WITH MEXICO

The War with Mexico, from 1846 to 1848, brought the first glimmerings of the future relationship between the armed services and the public through the press. In this war for the first time correspondents accompanied the troops and frequently participated in battles.

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<sup>2</sup>Army Information School, History of Armed Forces Public Information, A lecture (Fort Slocum, New York, 1954).

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.



But there is no evidence that correspondents were embarked in naval vessels off Vera Cruz or California.

#### IV. THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War saw the complete flowering of war correspondents and the adoption of these professional men as fixtures in all the staffs of large newspapers.<sup>4</sup>

The Navy fared better than the Army--where many a general thought of a correspondent as a spy. Admirals Foote and Farragut regularly carried correspondents on their flagships during the Mississippi and New Orleans campaigns.

The battle between the Merrimac (renamed Virginia) and the Monitor in Hampton Roads was interrupted because the press boat was in the line of fire of the two vessels.

Another incident concerned an illustrator for Harper's Weekly who shouted a warning from a vantage point in the rigging of the Federal warship "Mississippi," thus averting a collision with the Confederate ram "Manassas." The second in command who received the warning was, himself, to make many a future headline. He was Lieutenant George Dewey, USN.<sup>5</sup>

#### V. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

During this war the correspondents again freely roamed the battlefield, giving advice and occasionally taking part in battles.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



There was no method or system for accrediting war correspondents, although the Navy Department made the first move in that direction by issuing passes allowing reporters to go aboard certain vessels during operations in the Caribbean.

The journalistic romanticism of the day was further exploited by the many famous phrases and incidents that obtained wide-publicity--almost all involving the Navy. And, once again, the Navy--just as during the Civil War--came out much better in its relations with the press than did the Army.<sup>6</sup>

For example, Admiral Dewey allowed and encouraged full coverage of action at Manila. So it is not surprising that there was a reporter on hand on the morning of March 17, 1898, to report his famous order to the captain of the "Olympia": "You may fire when ready, Gridley."

## VI. 1900 - 1916

Public interest in the services again waned between wars as it had throughout history. But, while the Army was discouraging reporters from having interviews with military leaders, the Navy was thinking about the problem.<sup>7</sup>

The Secretary of the Navy suggested an information office to deal with the press and with book and magazine

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.



publishers. Unfortunately, this suggestion was made while President Taft's special committee was studying ways of effecting economies, so nothing was done about the Navy's plan.

The War Department, incidentally, appointed the first press release officer in 1916. The man who headed this office was Major Douglas MacArthur.

## VII. WORLD WAR I

At the outbreak of World War I, there was a natural clamor for censorship. To satisfy this demand, President Wilson appointed a newspaperman of repute and of great organizing ability and imagination to head a committee of public information--a man named George Creel. The Creel committee coordinated all government information and revolutionized the entire philosophy of government informational services. Here, for the first time, was found the government taking responsibility for informing the press.<sup>8</sup>

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels began holding two press conferences a day in his office. And, soon after the United States entered the war, the Secretary established the Navy News Bureau--similar to the War Department Press Section--which was directed by the Secretary.<sup>9</sup> Today, the Secretary is still charged with the responsibility for

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 155.





directing Navy public relations.

The World War I Navy News Bureau was headed by a newspaper man, John Jenkins. Although a start, it was inadequate. According to Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, USN:<sup>10</sup>

Jenkins and his staff did a fine job, but they were too few and too concentrated to be able to more than scratch the surface of the ignorance that separated the Navy from its supporters.

This war saw the most orderly issuance of news releases and control of correspondents in the field thus far obtained.

#### VIII. 1921 TO WORLD WAR II

The need for good public relations continued to be recognized by the Navy following World War I. In 1922, a Public Relations unit was established as a branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence.<sup>11</sup> However, due to economy measures the funds were drastically cut and the Navy News Bureau seriously curtailed. Finally, a naval reserve officer took over the News Bureau, but was required to run it during his off-duty hours on his own time.

In the Army, a minute information bureau also continued operations under the intelligence staff.

There were isolated cases of progress in military information, however. In 1927, a young naval officer named

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<sup>10</sup>Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, op. cit., p. 23

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 2



Robert B. Carney--later to become Chief of Naval Operations--arranged for news from the fleet to be sent by wireless for the first time during battle maneuvers.<sup>12</sup>

In the late thirties, the importance of the small Navy News Branch in Washington became apparent. And, in 1939, it was renamed the Public Relations branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence and offices were established in all the naval districts.<sup>13</sup>

Unlike the slow moving Army and Navy, the brash youngster of the Armed Forces, the Air Corps, less bound by tradition, moved rapidly to capitalize on the glamour and color of their new weapon of war. The trail blazing commenced as far back as 1935 when Hap Arnold--to become the Air Force's first Chief of Staff--was chief of the information division office of the Chief of Air Services, in the War Department.<sup>14</sup>

## IX. WORLD WAR II

In 1940, the Navy--along with the Army--perceived a need for expansion of public relations programs. The repressive hands of the intelligence staffs were removed.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Statement by ADM Robert B. Carney, USN, April 1953, personal interview.

<sup>13</sup>U. S. Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 155

<sup>14</sup>Cutlip, op. cit., p. 25

<sup>15</sup>U. S. Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 156.



At the same time, the Chief of Naval Operations declared public relations to be a function of command.<sup>16</sup>

World War II proved to be the best reported war and the period of best relations to date between the services and the press. There was a rapidity of communications without parallel. News was transmitted by wire, radio, radio-photo and on film. Many a sailor learned of the progress of the war--even in his own area--by monitoring night news transmissions.

Travel by air also was greatly accelerated. Hundreds of correspondents flocked overseas to the various areas of conflict and the services accepted the full responsibility of caring for them.<sup>17</sup>

In the Navy, there was the opportunity to bring home forcibly to the public the meaning and importance of sea power. Navy public relations activities were expanded to seek this opportunity. On the whole, however, the opportunity was lost because of the lack of long-range planning.<sup>18</sup>

In 1944, the Navy public relations structure was reorganized for increased efficiency, and early in 1945, the first signs of a carefully thought-out national program appeared. The plan was designed to achieve both long-range and intermediate objectives.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Army Information School, op. cit.

<sup>18</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 156.



## X. POST WAR INFORMATION

In an effort to eliminate feuding and to effect unification, an Office of Public Information was created for the National Military Establishment.

James Forrestal, a former Secretary of the Navy and the first Secretary of Defense, established the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, in March 1949, as:

the sole agency for the National Military Establishment at the seat of the government for the dissemination of information to media of public information, to civil organizations, veterans organizations and other civilian public bodies, with the exceptions of the Congress of the United States.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps the singlemost change since that time was the appreciation of public relations throughout the service--although today it is still objectionable to many. In 1950, the Secretary of the Navy directed that a provision be included in the fitness reports of all officers covering their ability to deal with the public. This was considered one of the most important steps in the history of naval public relations.<sup>20</sup> The provision affords the means of reminding all officers of their public relations responsibilities.

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<sup>19</sup>Cutlip, op. cit., p. 27

<sup>20</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, loc. cit.





Having traced the development of Navy information, an examination of the present mission and organization of Navy information is next in order.



## CHAPTER V

### NEW NUCLEAR NAVY

Navy public relations and public information have but one purpose--to faithfully portray the United States Navy to those either in or out of uniform. In order to fulfill that responsibility, it is necessary to know the subject--the Navy--and its mission.

#### I. PRIMARY MISSION OF THE NAVY

The United States Navy exists for two fundamental purposes. First, the Navy's task is to support the foreign policy of the United States in widely separated areas of the world...Second, the Navy's role in war is to control and use the seas for our own purposes and to deny their use to the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The specific wartime functions of the Navy were spelled out in detail in a 1948 agreement called "The Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," or better known as the "Key West Agreement."

The Navy's primary mission, as expressed in this document, can be summed up as follows:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Department of the Navy and Its Secretary, a report on basic facts pertaining to the Navy (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1956) pp. I-1 to I-6.

<sup>2</sup>The United States Navy, A pamphlet prepared by the Office of Armed Forces Information & Education, DOD Pam 1-8, DA Pam 21-89, NAVPERS 92418, AFP 190-1-8, NAVMC 1134 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 8.



To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce.

To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication.

To seize and defend advanced naval bases.

To conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign.

To provide naval (including naval air) forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack.

In other words, the mission of the Navy is: Control of the seas--maintaining control of the sea as a ready force on watch at home and overseas, capable of strong action to preserve the peace or of instant offensive action to win in war.<sup>3</sup>

## II. CONTROL OF THE SEAS

The need for a powerful Navy to control the seas has not been made obsolete by the atomic bomber. In fact, as a former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, stated it:<sup>4</sup>

In the atomic age--in the age of the so-called "push-button war"--the need for control of the seas is more imperative than ever. We could not fight a "push-button" war for long without the ability to transport from points over the world the more than 50 rare and critical items, ranging from agar and antimony to vanadium and zinc, needed to make our weapons.

The American fleet is the lifeline of the free world...

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<sup>3</sup>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Carriers Are Vital to the Atomic Navy (Washington: Bureau of Ships, 1957) p. 18.

<sup>4</sup>Robert B. Carney, "Atomic Victory Depends on the Navy," Nations Business Magazine (February, 1954)



It is apparent that the struggle in southeast Asia would be hopeless were the free world denied the use of the seas.

This view was reiterated by the present Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke:<sup>5</sup>

The importance of the Navy is increasing as we move ahead into the nuclear-missile age. The importance of control of the seas is increasing. Most of our friends and allies are located across the seas. The Free World is actually an oceanic confederation (which) depends for its existence upon the sea communications which bind it together.

The basic role of the Navy, to protect and defend America by control of the seas, is essentially the same as it was 150 years ago. However, naval influence has grown enormously, and the weapon systems necessary to exert the influence have expanded accordingly. And they will continue to expand.

More submarines and fewer aircraft will make up the Navy of the future. The future fleet will include about 150 ships with nuclear power, surface-to-air missiles in about 200 ships, and anti-submarine aircraft aboard nearly all combatant ships.<sup>6</sup>

Control of the seas is indispensable for the prevention of all-out nuclear war, and if need be, for the long climb to victory after a nuclear attack.

To maintain control of the seas, the Navy's battleground has always been the oceans which cover three-quarters of the earth's surface. However, today, modern

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<sup>5</sup>The United States Navy, op. cit., p. 8, citing Admiral Arleigh Burke.

<sup>6</sup>"New Navy Will Have More Submarines, Fewer Planes, Increased ASW Gear," Army Navy Air Force Journal, Vol. 95 (February 15, 1958), p. 6





weapons like the jet airplane and the guided missile extend the Navy's radius of action far inland from the old limit of the high-water mark of an enemy coast.<sup>7</sup>

A new weapons system, for example, involves the Polaris--a guided missile.

The new idea, as radical as the development of the atom bomb, combines two new Navy weapons: the swift, deep-swimming nuclear submarine, and the intermediate-range, shipboard type ballistic missile, Polaris. Such a mating would permit the far-ranging nuclear subs, lying submerged offshore at vital points around the Eurasian land mass to launch thermonuclear missiles at any target within 1500 miles of their position, and be all but immune to counterattack.

With a minimum of ten subs on station, the U. S. Navy would be sitting within striking distance of 95% of the more populated Communist cities and 90% of the Soviet industrial empire.<sup>8</sup>

But primarily, the Navy is a deterrent to war--as are all U. S. armed forces.

The Navy discourages aggression. The Navy has a unique capability not possessed by any other force or service and that is the ability to apply diplomatic pressure with the nicest degree of control in the waters of a potential enemy without committing the country to war.<sup>9</sup>

To conclude, it would be well to list the following points:

The new Navy, is pre-eminently, a Navy of nuclear power.

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<sup>7</sup>New Weapons in the New Navy, A pamphlet (Philadelphia: General Electric Company, 1957), p. 5.

<sup>8</sup>"The New Weapons System," Time (March 3, 1958), pp. 14-15.

<sup>9</sup>The Increasing Importance of the U. S. Navy, A pamphlet, (Washington: Office of Information, Department of the Navy, 1957) p. 48.



Fixed bases in the U. S. and overseas can be geographically pinpointed long before an attack: so can ports and cities. But the Navy always keeps some ships at sea.

The new Navy has more jobs to do than any other service.

Since World War II and Japan's defeat by American seapower, modern Russia has demonstrated a new awareness of the importance of the sea, just as did the Germany of the Kaiser more than half a century ago after Alfred Thayer Mahan had written his epic "Influence of Sea Power Upon History."

The U. S. Navy is the first of the services to have every functional type of missile there is in operation and production.

The new Navy, now has an ancillary continental air defense role, as well as an ancillary strategic bombing role.

The direct influence of seapower upon landpower now extends thousands of miles beyond the high-water mark and the range of a rifled gun.<sup>10</sup>

### III. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public relations and public information have a vital role in connection with this New Nuclear Navy. For, as one source<sup>11</sup> states it:

It is every American's responsibility to keep informed of what his Navy stands for.

To know why we need seapower in global dimensions, why it must cost us so much in taxes, what we buy with that money, is the surest way to provide the enlightened support which the Navy must have.

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<sup>10</sup>The New Navy, A pamphlet (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957), p. 34, citing Hanson Baldwin, "Is The Navy Obsolete," The Saturday Evening Post, (August 11, 1956).

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 43.



Public relations and public information fills the role of enlightening public opinion on the Navy. This is extremely important today--perhaps more so than ever before in the history of the country. As mentioned, the United States let its armed forces decline in the past and the results were disastrous wars.

Today, with the growing role of air power, the Navy finds itself being delegated to a minor role. It must, therefore, conduct a vigorous public relations program to keep the public informed of its role and mission. It is believed that when the public is informed, it will demand a powerful Navy.

In the past the might of the Navy has been self-evident. The long grey line of battleships, then the aircraft carriers, dramatized the Fleet. But today it is hard to portray the power a Polaris submarine has, or the terror an enemy missile-submarine holds for an American city.

Thus, to repeat, the mission of Navy public information and public relations is: to enlighten the public on the role of the Navy.



## CHAPTER VI

### NAVY PUBLIC INFORMATION MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

One of the objectives of this study was to ascertain whether or not the public information mission of the Navy was consistent with the overall mission of the Navy. This chapter, therefore, outlines the present mission and the organization in existence to carry out that mission.

#### I. NAVY PUBLIC INFORMATION MISSION

The current Navy public information mission is simply stated:<sup>1</sup>

The information mission of the Navy is to inform the public and the naval service concerning:

(a) the Navy as an instrument of national policy and security, and

(b) the activities of the Navy, as compatible with military security, and

(c) the responsibilities and participation of naval personnel as United States citizens under the American concept of government and society.

As may be seen in Appendix A, the Marine Corps also has a short, concise information mission. However, the Army and Air Force have detailed missions which also spell out their public information "objectives."

The Navy makes a differentiation between "mission" and "objectives." The latter are subject to revision in

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<sup>1</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 3





keeping with the times, while the mission is permanent.

## II. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES OF THE NAVY

In furtherance of the Navy's functional missions and in discharging the Navy's obligation to inform the public and naval service, the current paramount information objectives are:<sup>2</sup>

(a) Understanding of the continuing importance of seapower.

(b) Understanding of the Navy's role today.

(c) Understanding of the Navy's future role.

(d) Encouragement for career service.

(e) A vigorous Naval Reserve.

(f) Public awareness of the need for a modernized fleet.

(g) Public awareness of growing Soviet naval strength.

## III. DISCUSSION

It is interesting to note that only the Army makes a distinction between "public information" and "public relations." This is a continuance of the misunderstanding of public relations in some quarters of military and civilian organizations.

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.



For example, a lecture at the Army Information School states:

...since 1949 there have been few changes of major importance (in the public information field)<sup>3</sup> other than the redesignation ~~by~~ all services of the programs from "public relations" to "public information." This change in nomenclature does not mirror a change in concept or policy, but is merely a bow to semantics.<sup>4</sup>

It is true that there was no change in concept, but it is not true that it was "merely a bow to semantics." For, as it was pointed out in Chapter III, public relations and public information cannot be interchanged.

One cannot help noticing that in neither the public information mission nor the public information objectives are the terms "nuclear power" and "missiles" mentioned. Yet those two items are today the Navy's foremost public attraction.

Nor is there any mention of the Navy's contribution to peacetime science--the Antarctic expeditions, the Naval Observatory's work, naval medical research, to name a few.

#### IV. NAVAL INFORMATION ORGANIZATION

Three individuals bear the entire responsibility for Navy information and public relations. According to the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual:<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Insert in parenthesis those of the author.

<sup>4</sup>Army Information School, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 7



### Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Navy maintains under his immediate supervision and direction those activities of the Navy Department which involve vital relationships with the public.

### Chief of Naval Operations

The Chief of Naval Operations will assure the effective implementation of the public information policies of the Secretary of the Navy within all units of the operating forces, Naval Air Training Command, and the bureaus, boards and offices.

### Chief of Information

The Chief of Information is designated as the direct representative of the Secretary of the Navy and of the Chief of Naval Operations in all matters of public information. As such, he shall be consulted concerning the public information aspects of proposed naval plans and policies.

The Chief of Information heads the public information and public relations organization of the Navy which is world-wide. Besides advising the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary on public relations matters, he also advises and gives guidance to the naval district commandants, the fleet commanders, type commanders such as Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, the naval air commands, and the numerous miscellaneous naval activities under the Department of the Navy.

Full-time public information officers are on duty in the naval districts, at fleet and type commands, naval training centers, the bureaus of the Navy Department, plus miscellaneous commands such as Commander Naval Forces Marianas.. Public information officers titled "command



liaison officers<sup>u</sup> are on duty at all the naval air stations. And, finally, each naval activity without a full-time public information officer, and each ship of the Navy, has a collateral duty public information officer.

#### Office of Information

To coordinate the public information and public relations program of the Navy, there has been established an Office of Information within the organization of the Executive Office of the Secretary of the Navy and under the direction of the Chief of Information.

The Office of Information is composed of three operation divisions--Public Information, Civil Relations, and Internal Relations--and a Planning Division and an Administrative Division. Appendix B details the specific responsibilities of each of these divisions.

In general, it can be stated that the Administrative Division handles correspondence, personnel and budget matters; the Public Information Division is the publicity branch--press, photography, radio-television and magazine and book; the Civil Relations Division handles guest cruises, liaison with national organizations, speakers and special events; the Internal Relations Division is responsible for the Fleet Home Town News Program, liaison with naval activities on





public relations matters, and the Naval Reserve Public Relations program; and the Planning Division works on public relations projects and programs for future requirements.

### Discussion

That, then, is the organization of the Navy information program. Under the Chief of Information--who is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Chief of Naval Operations--the Office of Information coordinates the public relations activities of the naval districts, fleets, air commands and other naval activities of the Department of the Navy.

It was to these commands, offices and public information activities that the civilian recommendations were directed.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE CIVILIAN STUDIES

Five distinct reports were examined in this thesis. However, one is the consolidation of three studies by John B. Shipman.

Shipman has been engaged in public relations in Washington, D. C., for nearly ten years. In 1952, in conjunction with Commander (now Captain) James C. Shaw, USN, of the Navy Office of Information, Shipman did a study of Navy public relations. The report was entitled "The Case for Navy Public Information."<sup>1</sup>

A year later, Shipman did another study for the Navy Chief of Information. This evaluation was confined to four areas: the Navy Reserve public information program; the selection and training of naval personnel for public information duties; Navy community relations; and the Navy's internal relations program.

In late 1954, Shipman again was called upon to re-evaluate the Navy's public relations program.<sup>2</sup> This evaluation was the first report studied in this research.

The second report examined was the oldest. It was

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<sup>1</sup>James C. Shaw & John B. Shipman, The Case For Navy Public Information (Washington: Office of Information, Department of the Navy, 1952)

<sup>2</sup>John B. Shipman, "Evaluation Study Concerning Navy Public Information" (unpublished report, Office of Information, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., 1954).



prepared by Jack H. Lockhart.<sup>3</sup> On May 1, 1946, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, Director of Army Information and later to become Army Chief of Staff, and Major General Floyd L. Parks, Director of the Army's Bureau of Public Relations, made arrangements through Roy W. Howard and John Sorrells, of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, for Lockhart's services. The Lockhart report is still in use by the Army and is a text for one of their training courses at the Army Information School.

A third report dealt with security and classification of material prepared by a committee headed by the Honorable Charles A. Coolidge.<sup>4</sup> Coolidge had headed many special government committees and had served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legal and Legislative Affairs.

The last two reports were compiled by Laurence O. Pratt. At the time of the studies, Pratt had just left from the advertising and public relations firm of Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn to open his own consulting firm. His brother, Albert, at the time was Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Personnel.

In 1955, Laurence Pratt did a study of the entire

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<sup>3</sup>Lockhart, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Charles A. Coolidge (chairman), Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Classified Information (Washington: Department of Defense, 1956)



naval public relations program,<sup>5</sup> followed by one on the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense.<sup>6</sup>

In the next chapter these reports will be examined and discussed with two thoughts in mind: first, in what areas do they overlap--in other words, do the reviewing experts all report that certain sensitive areas in the information programs were lacking or deficient; and, second, could these recommendations be undertaken by the naval information and public relations program, or are there extenuating circumstances which prevent their adoption.

Although two of these reports were not made for the Navy, they will be related, insofar as possible, to the naval information and public relations program. Lockhart, for example, wrote only about the Army. Therefore, in his actual report a recommendation reads: "The Army band should tour principal cities..." But, since this is a study relating these recommendations to the Navy, this recommendation will be altered to read: "The Navy band should tour principal cities..."

A similar formula will be applied to the Defense study compiled by Pratt, and Coolidge's security report.

The other studies of Pratt and Shipman were made on the Navy, so no modification of the recommendations are necessary.

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<sup>5</sup>Laurence O. Pratt, "Report on Navy Information" (unpublished, Office of Information, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., 1955)

<sup>6</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit.





## CHAPTER VIII

### THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Before studying the recommendations and their value, the question of whether or not the reports overlapped was investigated.

The recommendations broke down into seven major categories: (1) public relations, (2) administration, (3) public information, (4) civil relations, (5) internal relations, (6) plans and inspections, and (7) security.

Before progressing further, definitions should be given listing what each of the foregoing areas include:

Public relations: general policies dealing with the public relations of the Navy.

Administration: organization for naval information, personnel, training of public information personnel, and funds for the program.

Public Information: press relations, press releases, press queries, photography, radio-television, magazines and books, interviews, and a miscellaneous category including such programs as public information for the International Security Affairs organization.

Civil Relations: disseminating information on civil relations, speakers programs, bands, parades, holidays, open houses, athletics, Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, exhibits, national organizations, in the field, and organization.

Internal Relations: public information manual, fleet home town news program, internal information, recruiting and reenlistment, internal policy, and naval reserve public relations.

Plans and Inspections: departmental policy, inspections, objectives, research, planning, and war planning.



Security: security review, classification, over-classification, declassification, cold war, interviews, congressional, industry, and leaks.

# I. AREAS COVERED

The following table shows how the reports dealt with the above listed areas:

TABLE I							
NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF CIVILIAN STUDIES							
AREA	Shipman		Pratt	Pratt	Coolidge	Lockhart	Total
		Navy	DOD				
Public Relations			1			2	3
Administration	26	15	2			7	50
Public Information	2	5	6			24	37
Civil Relations	13	1	7			10	31
Internal Relations	25	7	2			1	35
Plans-Inspections	1	7	3			4	15
Security		1	3	28			32

Based upon the general categories, the following table outlines how the reports dealt with each specific area. As mentioned before, the Shipman report is a consolidation of three different studies which are being treated as one report.



TABLE 2  
SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY THE CIVILIAN STUDIES

AREA	Shipman	Pratt Navy	Pratt DOD	Coolidge	Lockhart
PUBLIC RELATIONS			1		2
ADMINISTRATION					
Organization		4	1		3
Personnel	18	4			2
Training	8	5			2
Funds		2	1		
PUBLIC INFORMATION					
Press	1	3			8
Queries		1	2		9
Photography			1		1
Radio-Television			1		
Magazine-Books		1	1		
Interviews					1
Miscellaneous	1		1		5
CIVIL RELATIONS					
Dissem. Info.	2				
Personnel	2	1			
Speakers			1		3
Band					1
Parades					1
Holidays					1
Open Houses					2
Athletics					1
JCOC			1		
Exhibits			1		
Nat'l Org.			1		
Directives	1				
Field Org.	8				1
Organization			3		
INTERNAL RELATIONS					
Manual	1				
Home Town News	1				
Internal Info	5	1	2		
Reenlistment		3			
Internal Policy		2			1
Naval Reserve	17	1			
Personnel	1				



AREA	Shipman	Pratt	Pratt	Coolidge	Lockhart
	Navy	DOD			
<b>PLANS-INSPECTIONS</b>					
War Planning					1
Department Plans			1		1
Inspection		1			2
Objectives		3			
Research	1	1			
Planning		2	2		
<b>SECURITY</b>					
Security Review		1	3		
Classification					8
Over-classification					2
Declassification					1
Military Policy					1
Cold War					1
Interviews					1
Congressional					1
Industry					1
Leaks					9
Administration					3

An examination of the table showed that while the recommendations were fairly evenly distributed over the larger categories, they were thinly spread within each grouping.

The largest subject covered was the administration of personnel, with 18 recommendations. A close second was the Naval Reserve public relations program, with 17.

Also high in the administrative category was the training of personnel with 15 recommendations. The highest subject in Public Information was press with 12; in Civil Relations, field organization and administration, 9; in Plans and Inspections, planning with 4; and in Security, leaks with 9 recommendations.





With this wide scope of recommendations, the conclusion has been drawn that no one area is considered more important or more deficient--but that most areas of navy public information and public relations can stand alterations.

## II. PUBLIC RELATIONS

It was surprising to learn that but three out of more than two hundred recommendations dealt with the specific area of "public relations." Of course, it is conceded that certain aspects of civil relations and internal relations also fall into the general area of public relations.

It also was revealing to learn that but two recommendations actually had to do with public opinion--the real foundation of public relations.

### Recommendations

1- Mobilize the best brains and experience in the country to discuss and recommend policies for the fullest utilization of American know-how in the field of public relations--in the interests of national security.<sup>1</sup>

2- The public in the long run will judge the Navy not by what it says but by what it does. Incidents have more impact than words. The Navy must do all it can, as a public relations job, if for no other reason, to prevent unfavorable incidents happening.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 1

<sup>2</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 46.



3- Public relations must be cultivated and pruned. You can't furlough your public relations or demobilize them until you need them - or they won't be there when you need them.<sup>3</sup>

### Discussion

1- It has long been a governmental procedure to call into service high ranking civilian technicians to solve intricate problems facing the nation. The problem of missiles and space recently came to the Washington forefront--and a president of a large university was immediately summoned by the President.<sup>4</sup> A look at the comparable status of the United States versus the Soviet Union was desired--and the President appointed a committee headed by Gaither. What is recommended by Pratt for public relations, is that the same theory be applied--that the top public relations professionals of the United States be called to Washington to share their "know-how" with the military in an advisory capacity.

2- If the Navy is good, the story told to the public will be good. If the Navy is bad, the story will have to be bad. In other words, public opinion of the Navy reflects what the Navy itself is. For that reason, the Navy must constantly strive to prevent unfavorable incidents from happening. And, if they are inevitable, full public

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Part I, para. 23

<sup>4</sup>James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.



announcement should be made--before the act "leaks" out. They should be acknowledged and cleaned up promptly.

3- Public relations cannot lay dormant until there is a "fire"--waiting until unfavorable public opinion flares up in protest before employing sound public relations measures. Instead, public relations must be constantly active in working toward removing the causes of public opinion.<sup>5</sup> When dormant public relations are called upon, often they will be found to have disappeared and one has to start from scratch. And, as Lockhart puts it, "that causes a lot of scratching."<sup>6</sup>

### III. ADMINISTRATION

A total of 50 recommendations, or about one-fourth of the total, were concentrated in the administration area of naval information. The specific subjects covered were organization, personnel, training and funds.

#### Organization

##### Recommendations

- 1- Make the Chief of Information a Vice Admiral.<sup>7</sup>
- 2- The Deputy Chief of Information should be a specialist (1650 or 1655) rear admiral.<sup>8</sup>
- 3- The Chief and Deputy Chief of Information should be immediately responsible to the Secretary and Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Canfield, op. cit., p. 21

<sup>6</sup>Lockhart, loc. cit.

<sup>7</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part I, rec. 4

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., rec. 3.

<sup>9</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part I, para. 18.



4- The Chief of Information should be the PIO for every division, section and branch of the Navy Department.<sup>10</sup>

5- The PIO in the field should have more responsibility in internal and civil relations.<sup>11</sup>

6- In the naval districts and fleets, officers with the rank of captain should be appointed as Assistant Chiefs of Staff under whom the functions of Public Relations, Internal Relations and Civil Relations would fall.<sup>12</sup>

7- When the PIO or Journalist reports to a ship he should carry with him a set of specific duty assignments from his Fleet Commander.<sup>13</sup>

8- Branch offices of the Office of Information should be established in New York and Los Angeles. They should not be a part of some other command.<sup>14</sup>

### Discussion

With the exception of the last recommendation, all the others have relation, in part, to increasing the status of PIO personnel, clarifying their responsibilities, and the scope of their authority.

Pratt's philosophy of having the Chief of Information a vice admiral, tied in with Lockhart's recommendation that he be immediately responsible to the Secretary and Chief of Naval Operations parallels industry. In practically every large company which depends for its existence on public

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., Part II, para. 63.

<sup>11</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 21

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., Part II, rec. 10

<sup>14</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 22.





acceptance, the head of public relations is a vice president reporting directly to the President. This is a recognition of the fact that public relations cannot be effective unless it participates at the highest level in policy making decisions.

There also are other reasons. First, such a move would increase the morale of the entire Navy public information program. Its morale is constantly being punctured by unending investigations and by the spankings administered by the Congress, the Department of Defense, and by the Navy itself. For example, the Congressional limitation on PI funds; the Defense harking that the Chinfo's will be reduced in size; and by such Navy papers as the Low Report.<sup>15</sup>

Second, the increased status of the Chief of Information would assist in securing the respect and cooperation of the senior flag officers of the Navy. They are the ones who make or break Navy public relations. In addition, it would make the billet one to be sought by outstanding rear admirals as a means to a third star.<sup>16</sup> In lieu of having the billet arbitrarily assigned, there would be competition for the position.

Third, the increased status would not only assist the Chief of Information, himself, but would assist the lieutenant

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<sup>15</sup>A board headed by Vice Admiral Francis S. Low, USN, in 1953 recommended the abolishment of the PIO specialist in the Navy. The Secretary vetoed the plan.

<sup>16</sup>Rear Admirals are "two star" officers, vice admirals "three star."



junior grade PIO in Subic Bay, the journalist in New Mexico, and the Commander in the Mediterranean. It would raise the prestige of the program, and in so doing would raise the prestige of each and every member of the program. This would facilitate his accomplishing the assigned job.

As recommended by Lockhart, the Navy's Chief of Information is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Chief of Naval Operations. It should remain so for the reasons outlined above.

Pratt's recommendation that the Deputy Chief of Information be a Rear Admiral and a PIO specialist would accomplish two major objectives. One, it would give the PIO specialist more incentive. This, expanded, would increase his morale; it would increase his productivity because he would be striving for the best possible performance to enhance his chance for promotion; and it would keep him in the service. Recent years have seen a constant flow of the best of Navy PIO's from the service to civilian organizations where opportunity for advancement--not to mention financial remunerations--are much greater.

Raising the Deputy to the rank of rear admiral and having him a PIO specialist would also have organizational and efficiency connotations. It would mean that within the organization there were two flag officers, in lieu of the present one, thus giving more weight to the Office of



Information and to its dealings with other offices.

From an efficiency point of view, it would mean that there was a "professional" in the front office. An officer selected for the billet would have to be one with years of navy information experience--which would balance the lack of experience in the field of the Chief of Information.

Pratt had two other recommendations: increased responsibility in the non-public information fields, namely, internal and civil relations; and, his advice to elevate the district and fleet PIO billets to the rank of captain.

Every commander recognizes that for the smooth functioning of his command, he must have the support of the community in which he operates. Yet, too often the command PIO is tied down with public information duties. To overcome this deficiency, therefore, the PIO should be assigned more responsibility for community relations, making it mandatory that he spend more time in this field.<sup>17</sup>

In internal relations, the Navy has no planned and coordinated Navy-wide internal relations plan. This must first be established within the Office of Information, then expanded to the PIO in the field.<sup>18</sup>

If these recommendations were placed into effect, it

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<sup>17</sup>Section V of this chapter deals with Civil Relations.

<sup>18</sup>Section VI of this chapter deals with Internal Relations.



would mean that the field PIO would be in charge of public information, civil relations and internal relations. He no longer would be a public information officer, but would become a public relations officer.

By making this public relations officer an assistant chief of staff with the rank of captain, he would be placed in the same relative stature as the Chief of Information bears to the Secretary and to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Lockhart's last recommendation--that branch offices be established in New York and Los Angeles has been accomplished by the Navy. However, his advice to have them organizationally responsible only to the Office of Information is not the case. The branch offices are responsible to their appropriate naval district headquarters. This is in keeping with Navy policy that the Commandant of a naval district is responsible for all commands within his district. It has not been a policy which has interfered in any way with the performance of the branch offices since close communication is maintained with the Office of Information.

#### Public Information Personnel

Public information personnel in the Navy fall into five categories: (1) regular Navy PIO specialists; (2) reserve PIO specialists; (3) other officers filling full-time public





information assignments; (4) officers having collateral duty<sup>19</sup> assignments as PIO; and, (5) enlisted journalists.

In order for the Navy's information program to operate effectively, a powerful personnel plan must be put into effect. As Pratt states:<sup>20</sup>

If the Navy wants good Public Relations, it must take steps to supply the trained and motivated people to do the job.

Pratt develops the personnel picture further. He cites the following example:<sup>21</sup>

A private company covers one state with a population of 2,000,000. Number of employees to be kept informed is 10,000. The number of people engaged in full time public relations work is 33. This is supplemented by the varied talents of an advertising agency, and help, guidance and support from the home office.

Comparing this with the present set-up in a typical naval district we find: number of states to be covered, 13; population, 38,000,000; Personnel in naval establishment 30,000; full time Navy public relations people -- 7. Outside help, little or none.

It is evident that the Navy's program for public information personnel is weak. This was highlighted by the civilian studies which made a total of 24 recommendations in this area. They fall into three categories: selection, fitness, and assignment.

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<sup>19</sup>At small shore activities and aboard ship it is impracticable to have a full-time PIO. An officer, whose primary duty may be navigator, is assigned additional duty as PIO.

<sup>20</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., p. 81

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 80.



### Recommendations for selection

At the time of the Shipman report, there was no means for a qualified reserve PIO officer to transfer to the Regular Navy. As a reserve he faced the constant threat of being inactivated, and the Navy of losing a qualified officer. Shipman, therefore, spent some time on outlining a transfer or augmentation program.<sup>22</sup> This program was established by the Navy in 1955 and in the initial increment a total of 11 reserve officers were transferred to the regular Navy as PIO specialists. This program is still active--although not to the same degree for two reasons: first, the number of vacancies are not as plentiful; second, all interested applicants were screened in 1955 and the new group of candidates is, therefore, much smaller.

Shipman had other recommendations in this area which have not been implemented, however.

1- Screen first-classmen at the Naval Academy and NROTC seniors to determine public information inclinations and aptitudes. Tag those showing such inclinations and aptitudes for future voluntary assignment to PIO duties.<sup>23</sup>

2- The Bureau of Naval Personnel should screen all non-specialist officers being considered for public information duty to determine their inclinations and aptitude for such duty.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Shipman, op. cit., pp. 32-35.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 41



3- That no officer be assigned to public information duty unless he so agree.<sup>25</sup>

Lockhart adds one more recommendation in this immediate area:

4- Persons assigned to public relations duty must have a genuine liking for and interest in the work, news people, and news mediums.<sup>26</sup>

### Discussion

Selection of regular Navy PIO specialists as at present--namely, augmentation from the reserve and selection from regular Navy unrestricted line officers--should continue to guarantee a sufficient number of replacements.

But, Shipman and Lockhart were talking about the non-PIO specialist and the collateral duty PIO. Admiral Binford, speaking on selection of these officers, stated:<sup>27</sup>

You must do more than fill the spot with a warm body. The PIO is an officer to whom you are entrusting your reputation, that of your command and the Navy. Consequently, he should be an officer in whom you have confidence, you can respect, and, who is interested in and adaptable to the work.

Shipman's recommendations were aimed at a long-range program--testing midshipmen for future PIO duty--and the present time. His advice that only officers who are inclined for PIO duty, have the aptitude for it, and are interested in that type of duty, is further supported by Lockhart who stated

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-42.

<sup>26</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 2.

<sup>27</sup>Binford, op. cit.



that "news people are quick to detect the officer who is dealing with them at arm's length with mental scorn and only because he has been assigned to the job."

In conclusion, the Navy should screen all non-specialist officers being considered for immediate or future assignment to PIO duties.

#### Recommendations for Fitness

Shipman recognized that in the PIO program, as in any organization or group, there are incompetents. In addition to contributing inefficient performances, they also give the entire specialty a "bad" reputation. To that end he recommended that:

- 1- The Chief of Information request selection boards<sup>28</sup> to consider selecting out officers with an unsatisfactory past performance.<sup>29</sup>

Selection boards use fitness reports--reports made out by commanding officers on all officers in their commands concerning their performance of duty--for promotion, and if the case arises, for selecting out of the service incompetent officers.

One of the problems in the information program, however, has been with the criteria used by the commanding officers in marking the reports. Few of the commanding officers have a PIO background or are completely aware of the

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<sup>28</sup>Selection boards are composed of nine senior officers and are convened annually to select qualified officers for promotion.

<sup>29</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 31





job the PIO should be doing. To overcome this problem,

Shipman recommended:

2-That the Chief of Information forward, through the Chief of Naval Personnel, a firm criteria for the guidance of commanding officers in marking PIO fitness reports.<sup>30</sup>

### Discussion

The latter recommendation would have two effects. First, it would lead to a more intelligent grading of PIO's. Second, it would educate the commanding officer as to what to expect in his PIO program.

There is one bad aspect of the selecting out program--that is the problem of how to handle the officers being "fired" so they don't turn into a liability to the Navy. The handling of these officers would have to be done on an individual basis--depending upon the officer and upon the degree of poor performance which caused the dismissal.

### Recommendations for Assignment

Recommendations for the utilization of public information personnel covered the specialist, the non-specialist full-time PIO, and the enlisted journalist.

The suggestions relating to the specialist included:

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 30.



1- The Chief of Information urge all PIO's to rotate junior PIO's in their office throughout all PIO duties.<sup>31</sup>

2- The PIO specialists be rotated between shore and sea PIO billets.<sup>32</sup>

3- That Navy policy be relaxed to permit PIO's to have up to five year tours<sup>33</sup> of duty.<sup>34</sup>

Recommendations relating to the non-specialist full-time PIO were:

4- That they be kept in the billet for three years.<sup>35</sup>

5- That newly reporting officers report with sufficient overlap prior to the departure of the outgoing PIO to permit an indoctrination period.<sup>36</sup>

6- Ensure that non-specialist officers who have had postgraduate training in public relations be assigned PIO billets, interchanged with regular assignments.<sup>37</sup>

Only one recommendation was made for the enlisted journalist. It is a large one, however. Pratt recommended that:

7- Better use be made of enlisted journalists. And that change of duty orders come from Washington.<sup>38</sup>

One recommendation, by Shipman, related to the former journalist who had achieved commissioned status:

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 36

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 37

<sup>33</sup>Normal tours are 2 years for junior officers, 3 for senior.

<sup>34</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 22

<sup>35</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 43. <sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 30.

<sup>38</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 23.



8- Former journalists should be assigned to PIO billets whenever possible.<sup>39</sup>

### Discussion

It is an old Navy tradition that junior officers be rotated among all duties in a ship or command. But it is not because of tradition that this recommendation for rotating PIO junior officers should be employed. These officers, in addition to fulfilling a PIO job, are also in training for higher rank and more responsibility. Complete knowledge of all aspects of the field, therefore, is a prerequisite.

The second set of recommendations dealt with length of tours. Both were based on the fact that a PIO deals with people--and the more intimately he knows these contacts, the better job he can do. If a PIO is reassigned just after he has become accepted by community leaders and the media--and a new, unknown takes over--the overall program, in general, and the command, in specific, will suffer.

Again, the individual must be thought of, however. It is known<sup>40</sup> that most PIO's are not in favor of a lengthy tour. One of the main reasons they are in the service is because of the chance "to travel." If the PIO became dissatisfied because of being in one place too long, the program would also suffer. A solution might be that the PIO's desires are determined, and, if there is no objection, he be retained for

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<sup>39</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>40</sup>Personal discussions with Navy PIO's.



an extended tour.

A shorter tour is recommended for the non-specialist, as it would be detrimental to his career if he were kept away from sea-going line billets for too long a period.

All the remainder of the recommendations in this area are self-explanatory and obvious, with one exception. That one deals with the enlisted journalist.

Presently journalists are assigned to ships and activities. Where the difficulty arises is the case wherein a ship goes into dry dock for six months over-haul. The journalist has no work. Meanwhile, another ship engaged in a newsworthy venture may be short-handed for journalists.

The solution would be to have journalists assigned from the Pentagon to ships about to be engaged in a newsworthy cruise. When the cruise is completed, the journalist is again available for transfer. Maximum utilization of his service's would be put to use.

As with every plan, there is a dark side. In this case it would be the individual. He would be constantly on the move which is not conducive to a family life. Lower morale would be the result in most cases. As a solution to this problem, the journalist should be assigned to a shore command after a sea assignment of four months or more. The shore command should be his "home port" and after a six month period there, he would again be eligible for sea assignment.





## Training

A summation of the foregoing, and the need for training, are included in a statement by Major General Floyd Parks, USA, former Chief of Army Information, in Congressional testimony.

The General stated:

A need exists for a trained corps of public information officers who have the confidence of both the military and representatives of the news media and who know not only the requirements of the media, but the mechanics and timing involved in publishing or broadcasting news. These information officers must be fully acquainted with the complex structure of the military in order to know where to get the news, and they must be able to recognize the news values of military actions, which most military men do not, and be of enough rank and force to convince reluctant staff officers of the wisdom of releasing news promptly and properly.

This need for trained information people within the military itself must be recognized if the information is to be gotten to the public. It must also be recognized that the activity requires a sizeable number of people.<sup>41</sup>

## Recommendations

A few of the recommendations in this area have already been implemented. These include the sending of PIO's to Navy information courses, to the Armed Forces Staff College, and to civilian institutions such as Boston University's School of Public Relations and Communications.

Other recommendations include:

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<sup>41</sup>United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Information From Federal Departments and Agencies, Hearings before Subcommittee, 84th Congress, 2d Session, July 9-12, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 1075.



1- Commanding officers should send their collateral duty PIO's to the Navy information course.<sup>42</sup>

2- Non-specialist PIO's should be sent to the Navy information course prior to reporting for duty.<sup>43</sup>

3- PIO's and journalists should be given two weeks training in practical media work.<sup>44</sup>

4- PIO specialists should be given six months practical training in public information.<sup>45</sup>

5- An exchange plan with private industry should be initiated.<sup>46</sup>

6- The PIO Manual should be required reading for all collateral duty PIO's.<sup>47</sup>

7- The curriculum at the Naval Academy should be studied to determine if public relations can be added.<sup>48</sup>

### Discussion

If there ever was an Alice in Wonderland it would be a service officer (the average officer not the specialist trained in public relations) trying to deal with reporters or photographers.<sup>49</sup>

This statement tells the reason why training is important--especially for the non-specialist. As for the specialist,

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<sup>42</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 47

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 42

<sup>44</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 18

<sup>45</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 40

<sup>46</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part I, rec. 1

<sup>47</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>48</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 15

<sup>49</sup>Robert Lindsay, This High Name, Public Relations and the U. S. Marine Corps, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1956), p. 47



the only recommendation concerned training with industry. Both Shipman and Pratt dealt with this area.

Pratt prefaced his recommendations on training with the thought that a training branch should be established in Chinfo to coordinate the program.

Under the Pratt plan, certain key industries would be contacted and asked to cooperate with the Office of Information. His original recommendation--in his Navy report--was for an exchange plan, the Navy sending an officer to industry, and an industrial public relations man serving with the Navy for one month periods. However, he now states<sup>50</sup> that with the shortage of naval PIO's, he feels it would be better to just have the Navy officers serve with industry. "Having an industrial man in a Navy office would tie up a PIO who would have to spend as much time indoctrinating the individual, as he would in learning any of the business."

In addition to having the PIO receive excellent training in the industrial public relations organization, it would also spread the Navy's public information objectives in areas where future cooperation might be stimulated.

The attendance at the Navy information course by non-specialists and collateral duty PIO's should be carried out for obvious reasons, as should be making the Public Information manual required reading.

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<sup>50</sup>Statement by Laurence O. Pratt, personal interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958.



"Since public relations is a command function, future commanders should be trained in the fundamentals." Thus, Pratt supports his recommendation for a public relations course at the Naval Academy. A former Chief of Information disagrees, however. Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor concedes that it is a good idea. However, Admiral Taylor points out that the present curriculum is overloaded, and, also, that such training would be more effective after the officers had served a short period with the fleet.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Statement by Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, personal interview, Newport, Rhode Island, March, 1958.





The author takes exception to this latter statement on the grounds that public relations training would be extremely worthwhile for the embryo officer. His first assignment will be tough enough, but it would be facilitated if he knew how to form favorable opinions and attitudes in the minds of his men and also the means to higher morale. In addition, a midshipman, or a new ensign stands out as a representative of the Navy. They should know how to deal with the public and with the media.

### Funds

In 1950, the Congress imposed a limitation on the amount of money that can be expended on public information. For fiscal year 1958, the Defense Department is limited to spending \$3,000,000. Of this, the Navy gets \$816,667. However, the Navy must "kick-back" to the Defense Department \$105,000 for the salaries of naval personnel serving in Defense public information, leaving the Navy a total of \$711,667 for their world-wide program. For a comparison, civilian organizations such as American Iron and Steel Institute spend \$1,500,500 to \$2,000,000 annually.

The Congressional limitation applies to salaries and other expenses.<sup>52</sup> All recommendations concerning funds relate to this limitation.

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<sup>52</sup>See Appendix C.



### Recommendations

1-The Secretary of the Navy should urge the Secretary of Defense to work with Congress towards the elimination of the limitation.<sup>53</sup>

2- That the Office of Information be divided into two sections--section one engaged in activities covered by the limitation, section two other activities.<sup>54</sup>

### Discussion

It has been pointed out many times that this limitation is not practicable. For example, in Congressional testimony, Major General Floyd Parks said:

I honestly think that if strictly and literally enforced, the entire annual limitation for the Army would be exhausted within two months. Should the Army then cease all service to the press and public for the next ten months?<sup>55</sup>

Pratt also points out that the law is impossible to administer. For example, a Journalist collected personal items for the Ship's newspaper--an activity designed for ship morale and not covered by the limitation. Of ten items, six were suitable for use by the Fleet Home Town News Center. How should the Journalist's time be allocated?

In addition to its impracticability, the law is costly to administer. The estimate for 1954 was \$323,000.

Under the reorganization of the Office of Information,

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<sup>53</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 25

<sup>54</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 2

<sup>55</sup>United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, July 9-12, 1956, op. cit., p. 1079.



it was the hope of Pratt that the section engaged in activities covered by the limitation would be allowed to spend the maximum amount of funds available. The limitation, then, would not apply to the second section. Before implementation of this plan, Pratt suggests the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislation and Public Affairs rule on any possible adverse reaction in Congress if this were to be done.

In general, it is recommended that the limitation of funds be opposed before the Congress because it is a threat to national security, limits our ability to keep the public informed, is impractical to administer<sup>56</sup> and is costly to administer.

It is dangerous to national security, Pratt points out, because an uninformed public will let its armed forces decline below the minimum level of preparedness.

Finally, Pratt states that the law doesn't accomplish what was intended--it hasn't stopped service rivalry. Such cannot be legislated.<sup>57</sup>

#### IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION

Public information, as has been pointed out, is the backbone of naval public relations. Today, the public

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<sup>56</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, loc. cit.

<sup>57</sup>Statement by Laurence O. Pratt, personal interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958.



relations officer is titled "PIO" or public information officer.

Public information covers the media field. The recommendations, therefore, fall into the following categories: press, queries, interviews, photography, magazines and books, and radio-television.

Lockhart devoted exactly half of his study to the field of public information. This was not startling, however, since he was a professional newsman. The other reports dealt mainly with the release of information (not to be confused with security) and press relations.

### Press

The Navy is a daily source of news developments. These should be detected by the Navy and given to the public.<sup>58</sup> The vehicles for getting this information to the American citizens include radio, television, magazines, books and the press. For the relations with the latter, the civilian studies made a dozen recommendations.

### Recommendations

1- The Office of Information should detect Navy news, prepare general press releases, and take all necessary steps to give the information the widest possible distribution.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 64

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.





2- A News Origination Branch should be established with specialists in newspaper, magazines and books, radio and television, and still and motion pictures included.<sup>60</sup>

3- There should be two or three good "legmen" constantly at work in the Pentagon, pushing their way into Navy Department offices, finding out what is going on.<sup>61</sup>

4- Press releases should be apportioned so that morning and evening papers share equally.<sup>62</sup>

5- Fleet Commanders and District Commandants should be authorized to release feature stories directly to the media.<sup>63</sup>

6- A weekly naval news column, with photographs, should be prepared for release.<sup>64</sup>

7- Information about the Navy should be attributed to a special official by name.<sup>65</sup>

8- Top media officials should be the friends of public relations officers and frequent contact should be had with them.<sup>66</sup>

### Discussion

Recommendations 1, 2 and 3, all tie in with the idea of finding out the news and releasing it. It would be the

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<sup>60</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 3

<sup>61</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 46

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., para. 61

<sup>63</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 27

<sup>64</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 44

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., para. 63

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., para. 4



responsibility of the News Origination Branch to find throughout the naval establishment stories which the public is entitled to know as taxpayers and which tend to build within the Navy a pride in service.<sup>67</sup> The big advantage, administratively, to accrue from this recommendation is that the "news origination" branch would be divorced of the responsibility of processing news queries. At present, the news branch all too often is snarled in a daily routine of telephone answering. Thus, production of constructive publicity is restricted.

Upon development of the news, releases should be prepared and should be released so that morning and evening papers receive an equal share of "scoops." Lockhart stated that he had received complaints from Washington newsmen to the effect that there was an unfairly apportionment of releases. The news men indicated that morning newspapers seem to be favored--and pointed out that there are more afternoon newspapers with a greater total circulation.<sup>68</sup>

Still on the subject of the "release" of news stories, the present policy in the Pentagon is that all national releases must be issued through the Department of Defense.

All information concerning the Naval Establishment of national interest or proposed for release to national news media (except spot news) will be forwarded to the

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<sup>67</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 3.

<sup>68</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 61



Office of Information for coordination and release...<sup>69</sup>

It is further stated that:

The release of information concerning the Armed Forces at the seat of government will be accomplished by the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. Information concerning the Naval Establishment proposed for release at the seat of government will be forwarded to the Chief of Information, Department of the Navy, for transmittal to the Department of Defense.<sup>70</sup>

Pratt feels that such "red tape" reduces the flow of usable news from the Fleets and Districts and diminishes incentive of public information personnel in the field.

In addition, it tends to make a disproportionate number of releases come from Washington. This diminishes the newsworthiness of each release--and also means that the Washington area is flooded with military news, while other areas do not have their share. As the news travels from Washington it is cut down by each wire service editor--resulting in a major story being limited to possibly two or three paragraphs by the time it reaches the west coast.

Pratt, therefore, recommends that fleet commanders and district commandants be authorized to release feature stories, as well as spot news.

There is another reason. Local reporters daily cover the naval commands. Under the present policy they must be satisfied with the small, routine stories. Whenever any

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<sup>69</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.



major news breaks, it is forwarded to Washington and they are "scooped." Such a policy does not engender good press relations.

Another method of helping the newsman get coverage of the Navy would be Lockhart's suggestion of a weekly column. This would deal, in language understandable and interesting to the layman, with naval developments, weapons, tactics, science and history.

One other recommendation also aimed at furthering good press relations is that the friendship of media officials should be cultivated. Both Lockhart, as mentioned, and Shipman<sup>71</sup> discussed this area. Lockhart stated: "The value in public relations of such personal contact and friendship cannot be overemphasized."<sup>72</sup>

The final recommendation in the press field dealt with attribution of news. Lockhart supported his suggestion by stating:<sup>73</sup>

The policy of attempting to attribute all information to a "Navy spokesman"...is not a sound policy from the viewpoint of practicality and public relations. The press and radio do not like to use the term, strongly preferring to attribute information to a definite source. Also, it is not in accord with human nature to require news sources to be anonymous.

This recommendation holds true for not only press releases, but also answers to press queries, to be dealt with

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<sup>71</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 107

<sup>72</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 7.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., para. 63.





in the next section of this report. Admiral Binford also had a recommendation which pertains to both areas; which is worth mentioning:<sup>74</sup>

If you are more accessible to the press than other agencies who are competing for the same newspaper space, you will get the breaks more often than not. Your credit rating is further enhanced when your attitude reflects a sympathetic understanding of the urgency of those press deadlines which hang over the reporter at all times. The news media is engaged in recording history in a hurry.

### Queries

Hundreds of queries are received weekly from media representatives covering the Pentagon. These originate in many ways. A Washington correspondent may get the query from his home office in San Diego about a carrier sailing. Or, the query may be a follow-up of a speech made by a naval official, or Congressional testimony.

In the Pentagon these queries are submitted to the appropriate service desk, for example, the Navy Press Desk. The latter, in turn, passes the query to the Navy Office of Information for reply.

Only Pratt and Lockhart had recommendations in this field.

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<sup>74</sup>Binford, op. cit., p. 12



### Recommendations

1- The Navy Press Desk should be authorized to go direct to any level of command within the Navy Department to secure information.<sup>75</sup>

2- The Navy Department officials should inform the Chief of Information promptly of any information they release, since CHINFO frequently will be asked to confirm their action and furnish additional information.<sup>76</sup>

3- A responsible source for information about the Navy must be available at all hours of the day and night, seven days a week.<sup>77</sup>

4- The spokesman for the Navy must be someone not likely to be reversed two hours later.<sup>78</sup>

5- Responses to requests for information must be full and complete, no half truths.<sup>79</sup>

6- PIO personnel should be assigned to fields of information in which large numbers of queries develop.<sup>80</sup>

7- The use of "no comment" should be banned.<sup>81</sup>

8- The Press Desk must insure that they protect the security of inquiries.<sup>82</sup>

### Discussion

Approximately 30 per cent of the Navy's press branch's time is spent processing news queries. This area takes on added significance when it is realized that it is here that

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<sup>75</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 17.

<sup>76</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part I, para. 17.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., para. 31.      <sup>78</sup>Ibid., para. 34.      <sup>79</sup>Ibid., para. 32.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., Part II, para. 62.      <sup>81</sup>Ibid., para. 25.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., para. 21.



personal press relations are involved. Fast, efficient servicing of a query will get the Navy a friend. Poor, slow servicing will get an enemy.

Pratt's suggestion in this field calls for authorization for the Navy press desk to go directly to any Navy Department office for information. This would by-pass the Office of Information. Consequently, the Chief of Information would lose all control over what is released. It has been suggested that the Chief of Information could keep the Navy Press Desk in the Department of Defense informed of Navy policy. However, Chinfo officers counter that it is hard enough to keep Chinfo officers informed, let alone officers in another executive department. Because of this, and because the Chief of Information--who is responsible for Navy information--would be by-passed, this recommendation must be turned down.

Lockhart's recommendations are all general, and rather obvious ones which must be carried out in the interest of good public relations. Only a little discussion is necessary.

In the first place, the Chief of Information must be the "Navy authority" for dealing with the press. He must be so informed that it is never necessary for any higher authority to reverse any statement that he--or his representative--makes.

Secondly, to speed up handling of queries and provide better service, PIO personnel should be assigned to fields of



information in which large numbers of queries develop. These PIO's would become "specialists" in their field. They would be able to anticipate questions, and would build up a core of knowledge which would allow them to answer queries "off the top of their head." In addition, they would have established contacts in their field--officials who would know them and who would, therefore, furnish information more readily than to a stranger.

Thirdly, the "no comment" reply should be banned. Lockhart states that the PIO should: (1) say he doesn't know but will get the answer, (2) should explain why he can't answer--or, (3) should give the answer.

Finally, Lockhart reports that there is a feeling amongst some of the newsmen that their query is not held in confidence. For example, the reporter will ask individually and exclusively for information on a subject. Perhaps the story is a "hot" one and the answer is "hot." Instead of giving the correspondent the answer, a press conference will be called and the issue presented to the entire press corps. The newsman sees his initiative thwarted, and, next time tries to by-pass channels to obtain his information.

### Interviews

On many occasions information cannot be obtained through the simple process of question-answer. At such times it is necessary for the reporters to obtain interviews with naval





officials.

All too often, however, the correspondent telephones the official directly and sets up the interview--unknown to the Chief of Information. The first time the latter learns of the interview is when he reads the following morning's newspaper.

### Recommendation

1- Requests for interviews should be channeled through the Office of Information, and, Chinfo should be informed of everything said at an interview.<sup>83</sup>

### Discussion

There are two reasons for the preceding recommendation. First, Chinfo must be able to coordinate the release of information. It would be too bad if an official released information prematurely--when a much wider distribution of the publicity had been planned---maybe for many weeks.

Second, the Chief of Information must know who says what to whom. This is because he must be able to know what has been released on every Navy subject, and, he must be "cut in" so he can confirm or deny further inquiries on the subject.

One other point should be brought out in this area--although it was not a subject for a recommendation. It concerns press conferences--the only other occasion when an

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<sup>83</sup>Ibid., para. 65.



official talks directly to the press and answers their questions, in person.

Lockhart touches on this subject when he states that "the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations should talk frequently and frankly to the people about the state of the Navy."<sup>84</sup>

An informal inquiry at the Navy Office of Information revealed that these officials have held hardly more than one press conference in Washington since assuming office. And this is not uncommon. In Congressional testimony, the Chief Counsel of the "Moss Committee" investigating the availability of information, John J. Mitchell, stated: "Secretary of the Army Brucker has had one press conference and Chief of Staff General Taylor has had one press conference in a year and a half."<sup>85</sup>

If the Secretaries and the Chief of Naval Operations are the real representatives of the Navy--they must speak more often to the corps of press correspondents covering the Pentagon. Their words carry much more weight than a press release handed out in stereotyped style.

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid., Part I, para. 15-16.

<sup>85</sup>United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Information From Federal Departments and Agencies, Hearings before Subcommittee, 85th Congress, 1st Session, July 1 and 8, 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2399.



## Photography

Photography, in the true sense, has declined in importance in the Navy's information program over the past few years. Eyebrows will probably be raised over this statement. Today, however, the pictorial branches of Chinfo are limited to newsworthy stills and cooperation with commercial motion picture companies. All the remainder of their former responsibilities--furnishing stills for the public and newsreels--have been shifted to other sections.

Several recommendations, however, made by Lockhart and Pratt are still applicable.

### Recommendations

1- More guidance should be given the field as to the types of newsworthy pictorial stills desired.<sup>86</sup>

2- More training in "news" photography should be given naval photographers.<sup>87</sup>

3- A mobile task force to cover pictorially events occurring outside Washington should be formed.<sup>88</sup>

4- A more aggressive program should be undertaken to get more navy photographs in publications.<sup>89</sup>

### Discussion

At present, the majority of still photo releases are the result of screening operational photographs for newsworthy

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<sup>86</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 16

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.      <sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 57.



material. Only on rare occasions is photo coverage specifically requested by Chinfo.

All too often, newsworthy events go uncovered--or the coverage is not up to commercial news standards. To overcome this, more guidance to the field and better training in news photography is required. The guidance to the field could be in the form of a small illustrated guide, listing the types of photographic material currently in demand by the press.

Also, to help spread the word, the photographers who have been specially trained in news photography, should be reassigned among the maximum number of camera crews around the world.

As for the mobile task force, this group would be composed of the best available photographers and would be at the call of the information office only. This would guarantee that good photographers were available at all times to cover newsworthy events.

After obtaining this new supply of newsworthy photographs, Chinfo should then carry on by commencing an aggressive program--as recommended by Lockhart--to get photographs favorable to the Navy in publications. Such a program should go beyond the "spot news" variety and include human interest and feature photographs.





### Radio-Television

Today, newsreels are made for television, with motion picture theaters a second consideration. Therefore, responsibility for newsreels in Chinfo has shifted to the radio-television branch.

Only Pratt had any concern for television. But this concern was of major importance, Pratt states:<sup>90</sup>

The growth of television has been unparalleled in the history of information media. Its impact on reading habits and family life has also been enormous. We are only half doing our public information job if we fail adequately to recognize the importance of this medium, and organize to service it in a way that fits the requirements of the medium.

### Recommendations

1- Have the present Chief of the Pictorial Branch be assigned also as Chief of Radio-TV to assure maximum cross-use of facilities.<sup>91</sup>

2- Assign the responsibility for cooperation with television producers to the Radio-TV Branch, whether cooperation involves live programs or film.<sup>92</sup>

3- Representatives of the Radio-TV branch should have offices in Los Angeles and New York to provide on-the-scene cooperation.<sup>93</sup>

### Discussion

It might be stated that these three recommendations should be omitted from this study. The reason--they have

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<sup>90</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 15.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.



been, or cannot be, implemented.

As for recommendation number one, with the shifting of newsreel responsibility from pictorial to the radio-TV branch, there no longer is a conflict between the branches.

As for the second recommendation, it has already been implemented as stated above.

The final recommendation has also been implemented. As mentioned in the organization section of the Administrative area, there are branch offices in New York and Los Angeles. These offices, among other responsibilities, handle on-the-spot cooperation with radio-TV representatives.

Therefore, in this field it can be concluded that there were no recommendations which need to be carried out. However, those that were made are still applicable and their implementation should not be countermanded.

### Magazines and Books

Regardless of the growth of television, people still read magazines and books. This important communication field also, therefore, should be cultivated.

### Recommendations

1- Magazines and book branches of each service should band together to promote current Defense Department objectives.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Ibid., rec. 20



2- PIO's in the Magazine and Book branch should take more initiative in calling on magazine and book publishers, editors, staff writers, and free lance correspondents.<sup>95</sup>

3- Remove some of the limitations placed on signed articles by top defense officials.<sup>96</sup>

4- Have selected naval reservists serving on magazine staffs do active duty in Chinfo.<sup>97</sup>

### Discussion

Pratt's first recommendation is a fine one in theory. However, in practice it has not proven practicable. Suffice it to say that each service wants to come out looking the best--to stimulate enlistments and reenlistments in its ranks.

The second recommendation also can not be endorsed--through no fault of its own. Discussions with members of the magazine-book branch indicate that they would be all too willing to call more often on magazine officials. But limitations of time, money and personnel prohibit it.

For example, the Navy branch has but one officer. If he spent as much time as was necessary calling on magazine people, his office would go untended for days on end. "Initiative" therefore, is not the target, rather it is more people, time and money to allow the recommendation to be carried out.

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

<sup>97</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 7.



Pratt had one last recommendation in this field. It, also, is impracticable. It has been so proven.

The Navy investigated this recommendation. It was found that only a few of the professional writers are members of an active reserve outfit--therefore eligible for active duty. Of the few available, there could be no agreement upon a period of time when all could take active duty in the Pentagon. They would have been, therefore, straggling in throughout the year and no organized program would have been possible. There was one other drawback. The writers themselves felt that they would all be exposed to the same material and that there were only so many stories available. Even all of these could not be placed on the market at the same period as they would "flood the demand." Some of the writers would suffer by having their stories killed.

One last point, the writers also mentioned that if there was newsworthy material, their publication would cover it officially and no special program was necessary.

### Miscellaneous

There are three recommendations in the miscellaneous area which bear mention.

### Recommendations

1- Prohibit commanding officers from barring newsmen





from any area under their jurisdiction.<sup>98</sup>

2- Bring servicemen back to this country to appear at press conferences and on radio and television.<sup>99</sup>

3- Relax the style of letters written for civilian consumption.<sup>100</sup>

### Discussion

It could be anticipated that the "don't bar newsmen" suggestion came from Lockhart, the professional newsman. Lockhart, naturally, would like to see such a policy. But, from a military and security point of view it would not be possible. If implemented, it would mean that newsmen would have the run of military installations. Today, too much classified work is being undertaken on naval stations to permit such a procedure.

Lockhart's other recommendation, however, that servicemen be brought back to this country to appear at press conferences and on radio and television programs has some merit. However, funds would limit this to some extent. Perhaps it would be possible for utilizing servicemen home on leave. Possibly they could be granted extra leave if they qualified and if they appeared on public programs.

The last recommendation, also by Lockhart, is in the public relations field. All too often letters destined for

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<sup>98</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 18.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., para. 52.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., para. 50



delivery outside the military bear the formal, strictly impersonal tone of naval, or other military official correspondence. This style may be good for official orders, but not for civilian consumption.

A letter can be firm and still be friendly. It can be factual without being lifeless. Bluntness is never good in dealing with newsmen--or anyone else, for that matter.

PIO's should remember that their correspondence is particularly susceptible to getting into print or sound over the radio. The correspondence should be pitched between the "formal" and the "familiar" tone--neither brusque nor namby-pamby.

## V. CIVIL RELATIONS

Civil relations is often entitled community relations, the term most used in industry.

There is one great difference between Civil Relations, in the military, and Community Relations, in industry. This difference lies in the scope of the field. In industry community relations is confined to the "community"--while in the Navy it involves all civilians, anywhere.

The U. S. Navy Public Information Manual states that the Civil Relations Division of the Office of Information:

will administer the Navy Community Relations Program and the Navy Guest Cruise Program; coordinate special orientation visits of individual civilians or groups to



naval installations; maintain liaison with and conduct programs of cooperation with all civilian groups and non-governmental agencies which do not fall within the category of public information media, and answer queries emanating from the general public.<sup>101</sup>

As can be seen, civil relations covers a wide field. The recommendations, for example, deal with speakers' programs, bands, parades, holiday programs, open houses, athletics, exhibits, national organizations, field administration, and the Joint Civilian Orientation Program.<sup>102</sup>

### Speakers' Programs

#### Recommendations

1- In telling the story of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian, should be the forerunner for Navy public relations and, as such, must speak out.<sup>103</sup>

2- The Navy's speakers' program could be improved if there was greater participation of enlisted men.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>102</sup>The Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC) is convened by the Secretary of Defense to promote public understanding of the United States defense program. Representative citizens participate in the two or three day program in Washington and the eight day field trip to Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps installations.

<sup>103</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part I, para. 15.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., Part II, para. 36.



3- A questionnaire form should be prepared on which audience reaction, press coverage, etc., can be recorded.<sup>105</sup>

4- The Speaker's Guide should be issued six times a year at a minimum.<sup>106</sup>

### Discussion

It is only natural that the Secretary of the Navy, who is titular head of the Navy, should be the service's number one speaker. Also, because public relations in the Navy is the direct responsibility of the Secretary, he should show the way in any speaking program.

This program, today, is not an organized one. Directives and regulations in the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual give guidance. But, some commands lack any type of speakers program. Some have excellent ones.

All, however, could improve their programs by adding enlisted speakers. As Lockhart states: "I think the Navy would do well on all occasions when it furnishes speakers to send out an able enlisted man with every officer." Such a plan would be good for the morale of enlisted men, it would be good for the Navy, and it would be good public relations.

Pratt's first recommendation would fill two purposes. First, it would give the speech writers--who too often work in a vacuum--some indication as to the acceptance of the

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<sup>105</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 12

<sup>106</sup>Ibid.





speech. And, by surveying the newspaper coverage, they could ascertain if their message had been correctly interpreted.

The second purpose would be to allow the officers in the Office of Information, or other public information offices, to judge if the appearance was a success--both from the viewpoint of the speaker's performance, and from the support given by the sponsoring agency. Occasionally, a top speaker shows up at what has been heralded an important meeting, only to find that his audience can be counted on his fingers. Such a situation results in a waste of the speaker's time and in stifling his enthusiasm for future appearances.

Pratt's last recommendation is also for the aid and benefit of the speech writers. The Navy puts out many types of speech material--such as copies of top speeches made by Navy officials, a pocket speaker's guide, and Navy Public Statements--but it is not done regularly. Last year, for example, the Navy Public Statements was issued in January, another three months later, in April, and the third, six months later in October.

What Pratt recommends is that a small, helpful guide be issued at least six times a year. Its circulation should be limited to those who can make bona fide use of it in the preparation of speeches, thus keeping its production cost down.

All of these proposals would assist in getting out the word.



## Bands, Parades and Holidays

Special events, in any form, are the responsibility of the Civil Relations Division of the Office of Information. High among the list of these are band performances, parades and special participation in holiday programs. Toward these three types of Navy community relations, Lockhart directed some recommendations.

### Recommendations

- 1- The Navy band should tour principal cities constantly and in Washington in the summer it should play outdoor concerts.<sup>107</sup>
- 2- Navy units should parade often.<sup>108</sup>
- 3- The Navy should tie in with appropriate holidays in a way that will present the Navy to the public.<sup>109</sup>

### Discussion

Recommendations one and two have already been implemented. However, more can be done in the way of parade participation.

On special occasions, such as Armed Forces Day, the Navy hasn't sufficient units to go around and some requests from civic organizations must be turned down. However, not much is done during the remainder of the year to stimulate interest in Navy parades. For example, when a new carrier

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<sup>107</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 39.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., para. 40      <sup>109</sup>Ibid., para. 42



visits a port for the first time, excellent publicity could be gained by having the crew parade.

Parades, also, should not be limited to the continental United States. Visits to foreign ports by U. S. Navy ships are excellent occasions for parades also.

Besides parades, the Navy can tie-in in other ways with holiday celebrations. Special exhibits, window displays, speakers, etc., all would lend a nautical air to the proceedings.

#### Open Houses

Another excellent public relations program involves open houses--visits to naval installations or ships. These can be in many forms, but much care must be taken to ensure success. One cannot just open the gates, or lower the gang-plank, and have a successful open house.

Open houses consist of arranged tours by school groups, civic organizations--or just plain citizens. The objectives of open house and ship tours are to create a better understanding of the operation of the Navy, dispel misconceptions, create prospective recruits and officers, and demonstrate the efficiency and power of the Navy.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>110</sup>Canfield, op. cit., p. 624



### Recommendations

1- Civilian inspection of Navy installations and participation in Navy activities should be encouraged in every way.<sup>111</sup>

2- Don't neglect the many visitors to the nation's Capital.<sup>112</sup>

### Discussion

Some naval installations, such as the Naval Base at Norfolk, Virginia--the world's largest--have continual open house. Several tours are conducted daily at stipulated times.

Many activities, however, have open house but once a year--on Armed Forces Day. With very little effort they could have open house at least once a week, for example on Sunday as most Army NIKI sites do. In addition to providing a chance for the public to get to know and see the Navy, it would also be useful in keeping the Sunday "duty section" busy. This group must be held on the station in case of emergency--and assigning the responsibility of conducting civilian tours would keep them busy, thus improving their morale. Also, it has been shown by psychological studies that having persons participate--in this case selling the Navy to the public--makes them a stronger supporter of the organization. This plan, therefore, might instill a greater Navy spirit in the enlisted personnel and stimulate reenlistments.

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<sup>111</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 37

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., para. 32.





In Lockhart's other recommendation he points out a great failing all the military services have. It is odd how the services--with their large public relations staffs in Washington--think only about public visiting in areas outside of the Capital.

Thousands of visitors annually come to Washington from all over to see how their government works. They go to various spots of interest. For example, to the FBI and take a tour, have their finger prints taken, see the crime laboratory, the pistol range, etc. They then go away impressed by the FBI and are proud of it.

But one doesn't see any tours of the Pentagon. One or two tours a day, plus a few exhibits in the concourse, would show the public how the Navy--and the other services--conduct business at command headquarters.

### Athletics

#### Recommendations

1- Participation of Navy teams in athletic events should be general practice.<sup>113</sup>

2- Naval installations should offer their facilities for civilian athletic events.<sup>114</sup>

3- All-Navy finals should be rotated among the various principal United States cities.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup>Ibid., para. 38.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid.



### Discussion

Members of the Navy presently participate in a great many athletic events. These are usually of Olympic variety or national meets. Greater participation in local sporting functions by members of naval facilities could be encouraged.

Also, again aiming at bettering relations with the public and having the public always conscious of the Navy, naval facilities could open their athletic centers for use by civilian teams, such as the Little League. This latter proposal, also, would instill interest in the younger generation--a most suitable and influential audience--which in later years might handsomely reward the Navy for its effort.

As for the final recommendation, All-Navy sporting finals are usually held at large naval installations on the east or west coast. There are two sides to the argument of Lockhart that they be held in principal cities of the United States.

On one hand, holding them at naval installations allows the men of the Navy to witness the finals. This creates more interest in Navy sports and is better for morale.

On the other side, is the argument that holding them in connection with local carnivals, or similar celebrations, would create better public awareness of the Navy. This is undoubtedly true.



A compromise, therefore, is in order. The events could be staged in cities in which, or near which, there are large naval installations, at the time of a local celebration. Or perhaps, the city could be interested in staging a celebration in honor of the All-Navy finals.

At all these events it would be worthwhile to have Navy exhibits and perhaps a Navy parading unit to further make the public aware of the Navy.

### Exhibits

Naval exhibits and displays may range from a recruiting poster on the side of a truck, or the Navy art exhibit known as "Operation Palette," or a display of a guided missile in the lobby of a building.

Since preparation of exhibits strictly for public showing comes under the Congressional limitation of public information funds,<sup>116</sup> the use of exhibits is restricted. However, exhibits not specially prepared for public use--such as a guided missile--can be put to good service.

Exhibits are placed in two ways. One is to have the Navy contact an agency regarding the exhibit. The other is to have the agency request one from the Navy.

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<sup>116</sup>See p. 67 and Appendix C of this report.



### Recommendation

1- More careful advance investigation of certain types of events should be made to reduce to a minimum reversals in decisions.<sup>117</sup>

### Discussion

Pratt's recommendation would overcome one defect in the exhibits program--other than the lack of funds.

On occasion, a request for an exhibit is approved, only to have later circumstances negate the acceptance. Better investigation of the event would eliminate this, thus preventing a bad opinion of the Navy from being formed.

### National Organizations

Relations with national organizations is a two-way proposition. By cooperating the Navy furnishes the organizations with interesting events, exhibits or trips. In return, the Navy gets another opportunity to sell itself.

### Recommendations

1- The Office of Information should obtain more information about the kinds of material and/or events desired by the organization.<sup>118</sup>

2- Additional activity among women's clubs is suggested.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 14.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., rec. 11.      <sup>119</sup>Ibid.





### Discussion

The Office of Information currently deals with national organizations, filling their requests for speakers and visits to naval installations. However, they could assist the PIO and commanding officers in the field by finding out what cooperation is desired by the organizations on the local level. Also, what types of material they would like to receive. This information would be passed on to the naval installations for implementation.

As for the increased activity with women's clubs, Pratt points out that there is additional need for support for and from families of servicemen. To assist in achieving this, more Navy awareness in the minds of mothers and wives is necessary. This would be partially accomplished through working with the women's clubs.

### Field Organization

As mentioned in the Administrative Section of this Chapter<sup>120</sup> more emphasis on civil relations is needed in the field. Shipman, who had little to say in this area, concentrated his recommendations on suggestions for the administration of community relations programs in the field. Lockhart furnished two additional points.

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<sup>120</sup>See page 53.



### Recommendations

1- The Office of Information must be the center for inspiring community relations activity, but the bulk of the work in this activity should be done in the field.<sup>121</sup>

2- Field PIO's must be on the alert for opportunities to fit the Navy into the activities and life of their communities.<sup>122</sup>

3- The Chief of Naval Operations should point out to the Fleet Commanders how their commands can help community relations within continental United States.<sup>123</sup>

4- Appropriate line and staff officers should build and/or maintain liaison, at the state and regional level, with civilian organizations.<sup>124</sup>

5- Bureaus and Offices should be urged to intensify their field activities' community relations programs.<sup>125</sup>

6- The Chief of Information should arrange a one day community relations meeting at each of the continental District Headquarters for commanding officers and PIO's of at least all major commands within the District.<sup>126</sup>

7- Commandants should use their inspector general, coordinators of Naval Reserve, and public information officers to inspect community relations programs in their Districts.<sup>127</sup>

### Discussion

All of the recommendations are aimed at one target, namely, increasing community relations in the field. Guidance

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<sup>121</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 60.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid.

<sup>123</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 74.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 33

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p.. 40-41.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 77

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p. 71.



for this, however, must come from the Pentagon.

The Fleet Commanders could assist community relations programs by urging their commanding officers to initiate letter writing campaigns to the kinfolk of personnel aboard their ships. Or, as another example, urging their commanding officers to participate more in the "Guest Cruise" program.<sup>128</sup> Also, to prepare distinctive and attractive certificates for presentation to civilians who cruise in their ships.

The other recommendations are self-explanatory. However, a word needs to be said about the use of inspectors. They would serve two purposes. First, they would report to their Commandants the effectiveness of field activities' community relations programs. Second, they would allow the District PIO's to learn about especially effective projects and to pass these along to other commands within the District.

#### Joint Civilian Orientation Conferences

Annually a large number of representative civilians are invited by the Secretary of Defense to participate in Joint Civilian Orientation Conferences (JCOC). After briefings in the various branches of the Department of Defense,

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<sup>128</sup>Commanding officers of the larger ships report billets available in their ships whenever they are about to depart on a cruise--be it one day, a week or several months. The Secretary of the Navy then invites civilians to be a guest of the Navy for these cruises. The guests only pay for their meals.



the group visits naval, army, air force and marine installations for a week.

### Recommendation

1- A major television network should be interested in filming a JCOC for broadcasting purposes. Copies of the film could be made available for later distribution.<sup>129</sup>

### Discussion

The effect of the JCOC has been excellent on the limited numbers who have been exposed to it. Wider dissemination, however, would help keep the American public informed of developments within the Navy--and the other services.

The JCOC also typifies integration at its best. And the film would portray the role of the Navy and its coordination with the other services.

In conclusion, it can be stated that through civil relations, or community relations, the Navy comes in closest contact with the public. Therefore, an effective civil relations program is absolutely essential if the Navy is to inform the public concerning the New Nuclear Navy and to create in the eyes of the public a favorable opinion of the Navy.

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<sup>129</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 10.





## VI. INTERNAL RELATIONS

The internal relations of the (Navy) is one of the most important elements of the public relations program of the (Navy). If (naval) personnel have high morale, if they are loyal to the (Navy) and believe in it, they will pass along their enthusiasm to their civilian families and friends.<sup>130</sup>

The further significance of well-informed naval personnel in a sound public relations program is emphasized by General Matthew B. Ridgway, who stated: "When troops understand fully, there is less occasion for complaint and speculation, with resulting less criticism from the public, the press and Congress."<sup>131</sup>

General Ridgway left out one category--the troops themselves. When the troops are fully informed and have high morale, they accept Navy policy better, and they reenlist--making for a more effective Navy.

Perhaps, before examining the recommendations in this area which cover the internal Navy PIO system, internal information, the Naval Reserve, and the reenlistment problem, one should consider a statement made by Pratt. He said:

It is axiomatic that strong public relations starts with the internal relations program. If this is true in private industry, it is doubly true in the armed forces. Put in one group all the men who are serving or have served with the armed forces; add their families; then add their circle of intimate friends

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<sup>130</sup>Canfield, op. cit., p. 411

<sup>131</sup>Ibid., citing General Matthew B. Ridgway.



and you come close to a figure that equals the total population of the country. What people believe about the (Navy) can make or break your public relations.<sup>132</sup>

## Conferences and Seminars

### Recommendations

1- The field PIO's are on Chinfo's team and The Chief of Information must know them, how they play and what rules their commanding officers are forcing them to play.<sup>133</sup>

2- A series of two-day seminars should be organized in key spots around the world to be attended by senior Commanders, PIO's and selected journalists.<sup>134</sup>

3- Public information officer meetings should be held at least every six months in Washington by the Chief of Information personally for the exchange of information of mutual benefit.<sup>135</sup>

### Discussion

Some may wonder why the internal Navy PIO system, and these recommendations, have been included in the internal relations section in lieu of the administrative. The reason is that the Internal Relations Division of the Office of Information "will effect liaison and coordination and coordination with the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, and between the Department and all commands afloat and ashore..." according to the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual.

Under this charter, the Internal Relations Division handles all coordination with field PIO's--unless it is for

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<sup>132</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 29

<sup>133</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 27.

<sup>134</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 17

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., rec. 9



media business, in which case the public information division is authorized to carry out direct liaison.

For the Internal Relations Division director to effectively guide field PIO's, in the name of the Chief of Information, he must know the personalities he is dealing with. He must get to know each and every PIO and what their particular problems are. When he knows their problems, he can bring the weight of Chinfo and the Pentagon in play to assist in the solution.

There are several reasons why the world-wide and Washington PIO and commanding officers' conferences should be held.

The field meetings would allow the PIO's to have personal contact with the Chief of Information. It would raise the profession in the eyes of the senior commanders--the fact that they could talk with the head of Navy information.

Such meetings would allow the Chief of Information to announce and discuss the Navy's public relations policies--and to straighten out any local problems which may be at variance with overall policy.

The Washington seminars would serve similar purposes. On these occasions, however, only the PIO's would be involved. Field PIO's are constantly urging that liaison between their offices and the Office of Information be strengthened. And



that they be kept more fully informed on Navy public information and overall policies.

The other services bring their PIO's to Washington often. For example, at the Armed Forces PIO office in Los Angeles, the Air Force representative returns to the Pentagon about every six weeks, and the Marine, twice a year. The Navy PIO had never been back.<sup>136</sup>

The Washington conferences would serve two primary purposes--they would ensure that the PIO's were kept up to date on current developments, and, they would keep the Chief of Information informed on developments outside Washington.

#### Internal Information

Each bureau within the Navy Department, including the Office of Information, publishes a magazine or newsletter. At present there is no coordination of these publications.

Nor is there any planned program for the dissemination of information for use in navy publications throughout the service. A clip sheet entitled "Sea Clipper" was formerly published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. However, with the establishment of the Defense Department's Armed Forces Press Service clip sheet, the "Sea Clipper" was abolished.

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<sup>136</sup>Ibid.





### Recommendations

1- That the Secretary determine whether or not the Chief of Information has full responsibility in the field of internal information. If so, direct the Navy Department to cooperate with the Office of Information.<sup>137</sup>

2- The Office of Information should plan and prepare material for a continuous campaign for dissemination of Navy information to Navy media.<sup>138</sup>

3- That the Chief of Naval Operations explain to all commanding officers the importance of disseminating the Navy information through their respective media.<sup>139</sup>

4- That the Internal Activity of the Bureau of Naval Personnel be transferred to the Office of Information.<sup>140</sup>

5- A new branch should be established to advise and evaluate ship and station newspapers and departmental publications of a "house organ" type.<sup>141</sup>

### Discussion

As mentioned in the introduction of this section, many publications are distributed by naval activities and there is little coordination.

Shipman commences his recommendations with the thought that the Secretary of the Navy should determine who has the responsibility for internal publications. The reason for this is obvious. It is impossible to conduct an effective and

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<sup>137</sup>Shipman, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 89    <sup>139</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>140</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 5.

<sup>141</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 12.



efficient internal program with a multitude of bosses. Shipman felt that once the Office of Information was determined to be responsible for the internal information, it should then commence a vigorous program.

This would consist of preparing and distributing information for use by internal publications of ships and stations. To ensure that proper dissemination of this material is made, commanding officers would be informed of its importance. This would almost guarantee that they would personally see that the information was used in their publications.

Pratt's first recommendation goes back to Shipman's first--that the Office of Information ought to be responsible for all internal information. This would be in keeping with civilian organizations in which internal publications are the responsibility of the public relations divisions. Pratt also stated that close coordination of the external and internal information activities will greatly increase the effectiveness of both and can result in economies.

It is doubtful, however, that the Bureau of Naval Personnel would ever agree to losing its internal information program--at least until all other bureaus and offices also transfer their internal publications to Chinfo. Such, obviously, is not desirable as Chinfo would be bogged down with technical--as opposed to informational--publications.



Pratt's final recommendation, however, should be implemented. This has been informally attempted in Chinfo, but there should be a formalized project underway to evaluate and advise ship and station publications.

### Naval Reserve Public Relations Program

All the members of the Naval Reserve are emissaries of the Navy. However, they are not organized for public relations purposes. The only organized public relations program in the Naval Reserve involves the Naval Reserve Public Relations Companies, also known as NRPRC's.

This was one of the areas on which Shipman concentrated. Pratt had but one recommendation, Lockhart none.

### Recommendations

1- Intensify and expand the NRPRC to a total of 180 units in principal cities.<sup>142</sup>

2- Officers in Charge of Reserve Training Centers should be made responsible for activations.<sup>143</sup>

3- That an activation kit be prepared by the Office of Information.<sup>144</sup>

4- That a minimum of 75 per cent of the new members be experienced in public relations.<sup>145</sup>

5- That a maximum of 35 per cent of the members be in the captain, commander, lieutenant commander bracket.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>142</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 69, and p. 8.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid., p. 9.      <sup>144</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid., p. 15.      <sup>146</sup>Ibid., p. 16.



6- That Reserve PIO specialist designators (1655) be assigned to the inactive reservists according to mobilization requirements and the qualifications of the officers.<sup>147</sup>

7- That six carefully selected officers from NRPRC's representing geographical areas, be brought to the Pentagon to assist in developing a Naval Reserve public relations program.<sup>148</sup>

### Discussion

Shipman was concerned with the activation and administration of the Naval Reserve Public Relations Companies. He felt the number of units should be increased so that there was a unit in every city in which there was a Naval Reserve training center, plus other cities.

Prior to making his 1952 report, Shipman had investigated the NRPRC program and had found out such facts as: but 25 per cent of the members are qualified for active duty as PIO's and that 75 per cent were in grades of lieutenant commander and higher.

For these reasons, in 1955 he reexamined the two areas. He found that a recommendation had been sent to the Bureau of Naval Personnel regarding qualifications--and the qualifications have been changed--but, that nothing had been done regarding rank structure. As for the latter, new members with senior ranks are only accepted if a vacancy exists in

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<sup>147</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>148</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 13.





their rank. However, there has not been a weeding out of senior officers--unless passed over for promotion.

Shipman saw the NRPRC's existing for two reasons. First, as a ready mobilization force. Second, to assist the Office of Information, on a voluntary basis, in the dissemination of information concerning the Navy.<sup>149</sup>

Pratt differed sharply in his recommendation with Shipman's last statement regarding "voluntary" basis. He felt that a vigorous program could be conducted by the reserve officers. "We should use to the fullest possible extent," he said, "the abilities of some of the outstanding brains in public relations in the country, available to us in these (NRPRC) companies."<sup>150</sup>

An example of the Pratt plan can be seen in the Program for Harvard College in which a large sum of money is being raised for the institution. At the commencement of the Program, some 200 outstanding alumni--selected from Who's Who and other sources--were brought to the institution for a conference. Upon return home, each commenced a vigorous campaign in support of the Program.<sup>151</sup>

Under Pratt's plan, the reserve officers would be brought to Washington for three weeks. The first week would be devoted to indoctrination in the Office of Information;

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<sup>149</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>150</sup>Pratt, loc. cit.

<sup>151</sup>Statement of Laurence O. Pratt, personal interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958.



the final two to developing programs and activities for the NRPRC's.

As stated earlier, there are thousands of Naval Reservists--and each can do a selling job for the Navy, if they know what to sell.

### Recruiting and Reenlistment

The dividing line between over-all Navy publicity and recruiting publicity is often too narrow to recognize. Navy publicity serves three purposes: to inform the taxpayer how his dollars are being spent, to get support from the public and Congress, and to interest prospective enlistees and officers and to retain those already in the Navy.

It is in this latter area that recruiting publicity and public information overlap. For example, both the Office of Information and the Recruiting Service are requesting cooperation from media--to the great irritation of the media people.<sup>152</sup>

Pratt's recommendations are aimed at overcoming the duplication and improving the program at the same time.

### Recommendations

1- Move the Recruiting Publicity Branch from the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Office of Information.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Ibid., rec. 6.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid.



2- The Secretary of the Navy, with the advice of the Chief of Information, the Assistant Secretary for Personnel, and the Chief of Naval Personnel, should appoint a special task force to restudy the reenlistment problem, prepare a comprehensive public and internal relations program, and recommend a permanent set-up within Chinco to implement internal aspects of the program.<sup>154</sup>

3- The Navy should start at the earliest possible moment production of a half-hour television show for recruiting purposes.<sup>155</sup>

### Discussion

Experience in industry has proven the success of the separation of sales (recruiting) and the advertising (publicity) divisions. In addition, the Office of Information has material and personnel which can augment the recruiting publicity branch--and which can implement the program nationwide, working in cooperation with recruiters.

The special task force, according to Pratt, would help provide training and knowledge to men who might themselves become the future leaders of internal relations. The task force also would study why men leave the Navy, interpreted in human terms.

Pratt concludes that the Office of Information must know the problems of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in order to have better public and internal relations. This, also, would be discovered via the special task force.

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<sup>154</sup>Ibid., rec. 19.

<sup>155</sup>Ibid., rec. 26.



One of the areas where greater emphasis could be placed by Chinfo in behalf of recruiting is in television. Pratt concedes that there are "Navy" programs now on television--Navy Log, Silent Service and Victory at Sea, to name a few. However, his idea is to have the Navy have its own program under Navy control. This would be a "documentary" film in the sense that it would accurately reflect the Navy of today and tomorrow--the New Nuclear Navy.

Cost of such a project would be small. The Navy has many supporters in the motion picture and television industries who will lend their services. In addition, in Hollywood there is a NRPRO largely composed of experts in the field who would be available. John Ford, for example, is a Reserve Rear Admiral and has worked on Navy films such as "The Sixth Fleet Story." Also, the Navy itself is loaded with semi-professional talent and the background of ships and foreign lands are easily available.

This project would be especially effective in attracting recruits--for television is especially effective in reaching younger people.<sup>156</sup> But, as an important by-product, such a program would be an ideal way to explain to the public the vast mission of the Navy from the Far East to the Mediterranean.

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<sup>156</sup>Ibid.





## Conclusion

This section closes the last of the "operating divisions" of the Office of Information. The three-- public information, civil relations and internal relations-- have been discussed in detail.

Two more sections of this chapter remain--Plans and Policy, and Security. They will now be discussed, following which there will be a summary of the recommendations made in this Chapter and their relationship to the mission and organization of Navy public relations and public information.

## VII. PLANS AND POLICY

No military commander would dream of going into battle without a detailed operations order. Yet the public information organization of the Navy conducts a world-wide program with little overall planning done due to the pressing job of daily business.

The Chief of Information is responsible for this world-wide program. The "Bible" of the program is the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual. Yet, in the Manual there is but one paragraph devoted to the Planning responsibility of the Chief of Information.

The Plans Division is an advisory and coordinating group which will formulate public information plans and policies; conduct research, and study of public



relations projects and problems and maintain liaison with the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps on public information policy matters.<sup>157</sup>

That some additions should be made in the planning of military public relations programs may be inferred from the fact that every report--with the exception of Coolidge's security report--includes recommendations in this area. They covered general planning, coordination with departmental policy, inspections, public information objectives, research and war planning.

## Plans

### Recommendations

1- A Plans Board should be created in the Office of Information.<sup>158</sup>

2- The Plans Board should develop plans, policies and objectives for a constructive public relations program--both external and internal.<sup>159</sup>

### Discussion

The formation of a plans board was the first recommendation that Pratt made in his "Three Year Program for Navy Public Relations."<sup>160</sup>

The Planning Board would be composed of the Chief and Deputy Chief of Information, division directors, and

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<sup>157</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>158</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 1.

<sup>159</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 4.

<sup>160</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit.



the Head of the News Origination Branch.<sup>161</sup> They would be given the responsibility of developing and reviewing plans and programs and advising the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations--through the Chief of Information--on proposed plans and objectives.

After formulation of the plans, the Planning Division of Chininfo would continue to prepare the plans in written form and to serve as project officers.

### Departmental Policy

#### Recommendations

1- The Chief of Information should participate in all Navy Department policy planning and decisions.<sup>162</sup>

2- The Chief of Information should be given time to prepare a public relations program before policy is broken in fact to the public, Congress and the Navy.<sup>163</sup>

#### Discussion

Almost every decision made in the Pentagon has public relations connotations. It might be the closing of a naval air station--and the PR aspects would include the impact on the personnel assigned, the civilian workers, and the community.

Or, it might be the ordering of a ship from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Again, public relations must think of the

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<sup>161</sup>See page 71 of this report.

<sup>162</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part I, para. 19.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid.



impact on the crew and their families--plus the public information news value.

The Chief of Information should participate in these decisions. And, once the decision is made, he should have the Office of Information immediately commence to plan a public relations program which will gain for the Navy the best possible public opinion--and overcome any objectionable features of the decision.

As Lockhart states it: "Explanation should set the stage for incident, not follow it tardily and weakly."

### Inspections

Inspections are as old as military itself. Yet inspections have been foreign to the public relations field of the military.

### Recommendations

1- A new division should be established in the Office of Information called the Inspection and Program Division.<sup>164</sup>

2- This new division would evaluate reports and progress made towards accomplishing public information objectives in the field.<sup>165</sup>

3- This division would provide an inspection system.<sup>166</sup>

4- Someone from Chinfo should be constantly traveling in the field.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>164</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 8

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.      <sup>166</sup>Ibid.

<sup>167</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part II, para. 26.





### Discussion

Inspections would have a four-fold purpose. First, they would point out to the commanders in the field what their PIO's should be doing. Second, they would evaluate the job being done by the field PIO's. Third, they would show Chinfo the trouble spots which would allow the Chief of Information to prepare counterattacks, and fourth, they would supply a feedback to Chinfo on Pentagon policies being implemented in the field.

These inspections--if the inspector is competent--would provide a higher standard of performance by field PIO's. They would also ensure better coordination of activities between Washington and the field--an area where complaints are always plentiful.<sup>168</sup> In addition, they would stimulate the activities of the reserve units visited.

One reason an inspection program has not been carried out in connection with Navy public relations has been the lack of a qualified inspection team. There have been few senior officers in the Navy experienced in public information. Those that were on duty could not be spared to become inspectors. However, as more experienced PIO officers work their way into the senior ranks, this no longer will be

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<sup>168</sup>Pratt lists several complaints, while stating that "in every single instance there was hunger for help and direction from Washington," in discussing a survey he undertook while preparing his report.



a problem.

"Inspections should be carried out," stated Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, former chief of information.<sup>169</sup>

One additional task of the new Chinfo division would be the evaluation of reports submitted by field PIO's. Presently there is no reporting system and one would have to be established. These would supplement and fill the interim period between inspections.

### Objectives

As pointed out in chapter VI, the Navy separates public information objectives from mission. Pratt had two recommendations in this field which pertain to Navy information objectives.

### Recommendations

1- A series of public relations objectives for the next three months should be adopted and revised at the end of that time.<sup>170</sup>

2- That the objective "Peacetime Role of the Navy" be made the subject of an Advertising Council project.<sup>171</sup>

### Discussion

The present Navy public information objectives were promulgated in July, 1956--nearly two years ago. These objectives are extremely general in nature. For example, the

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<sup>169</sup>Statement by Rear Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, USN, personal interview, Newport, Rhode Island, March, 1958.

<sup>170</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part I, rec. 5.

<sup>171</sup>Ibid., rec. 7.



one "Public understanding of the Navy's future role."

Pratt envisions more specific, sharper objectives. Objectives which tie in with current naval policy, national policy and foreign policy. Ones which would lead the way better for the PIO in the field.

Public relations to be effective, must have objectives. However, as Pratt points out, the Navy must direct their public information objectives toward some "attainable" goals.

Pratt also ties in the objectives with public opinion surveys.<sup>172</sup> The Navy must discover what they want to achieve. For example, to increase enlistments and reenlistments do they want to direct their campaign toward those in the service or outside persons? What is the opinion of the parents? Why are men leaving the service? Does the Navy have to create a favorable opinion of the service? Or, do they have to correct a negative attitude?

Pratt also envisions the objectives as a measure of success for PIO's. He states that the success of PIO's in achieving public information objectives will measure their effectiveness.

Commenting on his second recommendation, Pratt states:<sup>173</sup>

If it is true that we must prevent the public from

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<sup>172</sup>Statement of Laurence O. Pratt, personal interview, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958

<sup>173</sup>Ibid.



falling into the trap of prematurely relaxing the defense effort, it would be extremely helpful to have a background advertising campaign supporting the efforts of the Navy.

Pratt also felt that to counteract in some measure interservice rivalry, it would be helpful to have the services coordinate their public information objectives.

### Research

Except for the Air Force, the entire public relations activity of the Department of Defense is proceeding without any knowledge of public attitude. Information concerning any slight downward trend in public approval for the size of the military establishment should be available at the earliest possible moment if we are to maintain our policy of stable military forces. This is a matter of national survival. Beyond this, a more detailed "estimate of the situation" based on scientifically collected data, is a must if we are to concentrate our public relations ammunition on constructive projects.<sup>174</sup>

### Recommendations

1- A research liaison officer should be appointed in the Plans Division of the Office of Information.<sup>175</sup>

2- The Navy League should be asked to adopt as one of its continuing projects the taking of semi-annual surveys of public opinion about the Navy--to be conducted by professional survey organizations.<sup>176</sup>

3- The NRPRC's should be utilized to take a quick survey and report back to Washington in 48 hours.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>174</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 4.

<sup>175</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., Part II, rec. 2.

<sup>176</sup>Shipman, op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>177</sup>Pratt, loc. cit.





### Discussion

A public relations program is good only when designed to attain specific objectives--as discussed above. However, it is impossible to determine exactly what these objectives should be without facts concerning existing attitudes and trends in attitudes.

Armed with these facts, the Chief of Information is in a position to advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the Navy's public information program.

A research program would consist of two areas: obtaining the information and administering it. It would be the duty of the research liaison officer in the plans division to bring to bear on public relations planning and policy all available research within the Navy and the Armed Forces Research Division. He would also work with the latter organization in the development of new research projects to provide a factual basis for recommendations and a measure of effectiveness of Navy public relations undertakings.

The public opinion surveys would have a second purpose--the first being the ascertaining of current public opinion for the guidance of PR programs. This second function would be to answer the question of whether or not the Navy public relations program is succeeding.

The main survey--to be financed by the Navy League--would be every six months. Its results would be of help to



both the Navy and the Navy League in the pursuit of their objectives.

The second survey--by the NRPRC's would of necessity be amateurish. However, some training could be given to members of the NRPRC's--either by the visits of training officers thoroughly indoctrinated in survey procedures, or by the calling to training duty of certain selected reserve officers.

Such a survey would serve a limited purpose--allowing Chinfo to get a pulse reading on the public's opinion at no expense. Reserve training credit could be given the participants as remuneration.

One word of caution is needed before leaving the subject of research. That is, that all too often research becomes an objective itself--and secondly, that research will provide no magic, pat answers to all the problems of Navy public relations.<sup>178</sup>

### War Planning

One more area needed investigation in the field of plans. Perhaps it is the most important.

### Recommendation

1- The Chief of Information has an important present duty in relation to the future. He must prepare to

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<sup>178</sup>Cutlip & Center, op. cit., p. 483.



maintain public relations and continued support for the Navy when security is controlling.<sup>179</sup>

### Discussion

Handling peacetime assignments and responsibilities and planning for war is a large and vital job. In other branches of the Navy Department there are special "war planning" branches. Within Chinfo, the Plans Division will have to assume the responsibility.

Such a program means consideration and planning now for operations under war conditions. Subjects to be considered include: censorship, accreditation, information policies regarding POW's, security review, handling of communiques, and public relations problems concerning the man in uniform.

These are problems which must be considered now for when war comes there is no time. Public relations would suffer accordingly.

## VIII. SECURITY

The final section of this chapter deals with security and security review. Chinfo is responsible for only the latter's policies, but also has ample occasion to apply the policies of the former.

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<sup>179</sup>Lockhart, op. cit., Part I, para. 41.



Almost all the recommendations in the field of security and security review came from a report done by a committee headed by Charles A. Coolidge.<sup>180</sup> A few were made by Pratt in each of his two reports.

At first blush it might seem that security and public information were at opposite ends of a continuum. However, this isn't true. Public information and security must--and do--work hand in hand. Often times, however, this is a most difficult job.

Vannevar Bush,<sup>181</sup> speaking before the American society of Newspaper Editors, stated:

There are factors of very great importance to the problem. Principal among these is our realization that the bulwark of the democratic process is an informed public opinion. The whole history of this country is a demonstration that the free exchange of ideas and complete accessibility of information are vital to the national welfare.

The riddle wrapped up in a mystery inside of an enigma, then, is the problem of reconciling the preservation of the values inherent in the practice of full and free dissemination of fact with the common-sense requirement that we do not put into a potential enemy's hands information which will help him to kill our young men, devastate our cities, and overthrow our nation. The problem is that of distinguishing between information which rightly and properly belongs to every man--and

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<sup>180</sup>Coolidge, op. cit.

<sup>181</sup>Chairman, Research and Development Board, and President, Carnegie Institution of Washington at the time.





information which for the safety and security of every man must be protected.<sup>182</sup>

## Classification

### Recommendations

1- Require that each program susceptible of such treatment contain a special paragraph dealing with information security.<sup>183</sup>

2- Give reasons for classification whenever possible when requests for information are denied.<sup>184</sup>

3- Cease attempts to classify information which cannot be held secret.<sup>185</sup>

4- Avoid changing the scope of classified information to reflect temporary changes in emphasis in our foreign policy.<sup>186</sup>

5- Make it wholly clear that the classification system is not to be used to protect information not affecting the national security.<sup>187</sup>

### Discussion

It can easily be seen how closely "classification" and public information tie in. A great majority of the subjects eventually released by the public information organization commenced life in a classified category.

In Washington, it is fairly easy to ascertain if a specific piece of information has been classified. However,

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<sup>182</sup>Vannevar Bush, (An address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D. C., April 16, 1948)

<sup>183</sup>Coolidge, op. cit., rec. 2.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid., rec. 8

<sup>185</sup>Ibid., rec. 2.

<sup>186</sup>Ibid.

<sup>187</sup>Ibid.



if classified material were given a declassification date-- or happening of a certain event--automatically it would become available at that time for release.

Outside of Washington this would be a tremendous step forward. For it is practically impossible for a field PIO to know what and when items may be declassified.

Coolidge's recommendation concerning giving a reason whenever possible why an item is classified, ties in with Lockhart's one concerning the use of "no comment."<sup>188</sup> In making the explanation, Coolidge points out that it must be emphasized to the correspondents the difference of today's "cold war" and normal peacetime conditions.

The last three recommendations deal with the administrative problems of classification--trying to keep an item classified when its existence is known by the public, constantly changing classification causing confusion, and denying the use of classification for security of administrative matters.

## Interviews

### Recommendation

1- Arrange interviews through the Office of Information with a representative sitting in on the interview.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>188</sup>See p. 78 of this paper.

<sup>189</sup>Coolidge, op. cit., rec. 8



## Discussion

Earlier in this report it was stated that all interviews should be arranged through the Office of Information.<sup>190</sup> On that occasion the purpose of the recommendation was to ensure that Chinfo knew who said what to whom. On this occasion, the Coolidge committee recommends it so that an informed PIO may assist the official being interviewed concerning security matters. Or, the PIO may assist the press representative in getting some items declassified.

## Congressional

### Recommendation

1- Care should be exercised in the publishing of reports of proceedings before Congressional committees to eliminate sensitive technical data and classified operational concepts.<sup>191</sup>

### Discussion

The Coolidge committee urged both branches of the government--Congress and the military--to keep in mind that unfriendly nations can glean a great deal of valuable information from the published reports of Congressional committees. To that end, the Navy should request Congressmen to clear classified Navy testimony with the Pentagon prior to release.

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<sup>190</sup>See p. 79 of this report

<sup>191</sup>Ibid., rec. 7



## Industry

### Recommendation

1- Steps should be taken to develop a better understanding in certain areas of industry of the hazard to national security resulting from disclosure of certain technical classified information.<sup>192</sup>

### Discussion

The Coolidge study reported that industry does a satisfactory job in protecting information except in one aspect. The exception is that in their desire to build up prestige, some companies give out damaging technical information in their annual reports to stockholders, in advertisements, at business conferences and to trade and technical journals. This usually is in connection with new weapons.

The Navy should conduct a public relations program to educate their contractors of the threat to national security such disclosure can cause.

### Security Review

Security review is a direct responsibility of the Office of Information. Following clearance on the departmental level, material is submitted to the security review branch of the Office of Public Information in the Department of Defense for final clearance.

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<sup>192</sup>Ibid., rec. 6.





### Recommendations

1- The responsibility for security review should be clearly defined and placed so far as is practicable in a single spot.<sup>193</sup>

2- The entire responsibility for Naval security review should be vested in the appropriate Navy section.<sup>194</sup>

3- Under directives, guidelines and policies issued by the Office of Security Review in the Defense Department, the Service review sections would be given primary responsibility for clearance for their own Service and for the Defense Department if no other service or governmental agency was involved. The Defense Security office would coordinate the latter.<sup>195</sup>

4- Final clearances would still be given by the Defense Department Security Office which would initial a form placed on the material by the service section.<sup>196</sup>

5- Manufacturers desiring to obtain security checks should deal direct with the Service issuing the contract, except where two or more services are involved.<sup>197</sup>

6- Greatest care should be taken in reviewing manuscripts from outside sources to refrain from editing or eliminating criticism.<sup>198</sup>

### Discussion

Pratt's thesis is that there should be a single responsible authority for security review. Today if a security break occurs, the Defense Department may blame the

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<sup>193</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 21.

<sup>194</sup>Pratt, Navy Report, op. cit., rec. 5.

<sup>195</sup>Pratt, Defense Report, op. cit., rec. 22.

<sup>196</sup>Ibid.    <sup>197</sup>Ibid., rec. 23.    <sup>198</sup>Ibid.



service itself, or the service may blame the Defense Department. There is split authority. What Pratt recommends is that security responsibility be concentrated in a single spot. This does not mean that it must be in the Defense Department. Each service could have its own security review facility. But that division would be the sole authority for releasing information. If there were a slip, the Service secretary would be held responsible.

Having the Navy responsible for Navy clearance has another advantage. It overcomes the natural reluctance of some officers to deal with officers of other departments without the subject matter being transmitted through channels. A Chinfo officer can deal with an operations officer by telephone. But, if the same officer were giving Navy clearance to a Defense officer--regardless of what uniform the latter was wearing--he would be more inclined to request the paper be submitted via appropriate channels.

Pratt's recommendation for manufacturers to deal direct with the service issuing the contract is based upon an Air Force test program. In this program it was indicated that the time for clearances to be obtained could be reduced by several weeks. This was probably due to the fact that the concerned Service has something to gain by having the material receive fast consideration--whereas, the Defense Department does not.



In the last suggestion, Pratt aims at a practice that occasionally occurs, perhaps more in the field than in Washington. The publishing of detrimental matter is not a violation of security and should not be censored. Even if errors are found in the material they should not be deleted. Instead, a memorandum or oral communication should be directed to the originator making it clear that there is no security violation, but that there is an error.

## IX. SUMMARY

More than 200 recommendations were reviewed in this study. Not all were discussed, some were omitted, others consolidated. In general, the recommendations proposed the following:

- commence a vigorous public relations program, utilizing the best brains available.

- make the PIO corps a high trained, well qualified group.

- raise the status of Navy public relations, elevate the Chief of Information to Vice Admiral.

- increase the career incentive of PIO's, make the Deputy Chief of Staff a Rear Admiral specialist (1650) - placing a trained PIO in the "front office."

- have qualified PIO leaders, as incompetents create problems.



-- screen non-specialists for PIO inclinations and aptitudes.

-- reexamine the assignment policy for PIO's.

-- continue to emphasize training in public relations.

-- divide Chinfo into a "limitations" and "non-limitations" organization, and work toward elimination of the Congressional limitation.

-- create a News Origination Branch.

-- always be available with an authoritative, attributed answer to press queries.

-- give more guidance to the field, in policy, photography, public relations, community relations.

-- show more initiative in the photographic and magazine and book fields.

-- include top-notch enlisted personnel in speakers' programs.

-- participate more in community events.

-- hold more open houses.

-- exercise more control over internal publications.

-- employ the cooperation of Naval Reserve Public Relations Companies more often.

-- apply public relations principles to the enlistment and reenlistment problem.

-- establish a Plans Board and commence more Navy-wide public relations planning.





-- advise top naval planners on public relations aspects of future plans.

-- undertake an inspection program for public relations.

-- undertake public opinion surveys regarding the public's attitudes toward the Navy.

-- commence war planning for public relations.

-- reexamine security policies and declassification rules and regulations.

-- undertake a public relations program in and for the Navy.



## CHAPTER IX

### A NEW NAVY PUBLIC RELATIONS MISSION

The recommendations covered in the preceding chapter are merely the means to the end--the end being a sound public relations policy. Any public relations program must, if it is to succeed, first be based on sound policy, then executed by capable personnel.

This policy must be broader in scope than the old, worn-out "publicity" and would serve as a guide for the military in their relations--both external with the civilian universe and internal with the other members of the military.

Navy public relations is a function of command that contributes to national security by evaluating public attitudes and executing a program of action through the efforts of every unit and individual in the Navy to cultivate and maintain: first, public understanding and appreciation of the Navy's missions and needs; second, the good will and cooperation of every individual and organization with whom the Navy deals externally in its day to day operations; third, high internal Navy morale, and, fourth, the respect and understanding of the people abroad for the government and the people of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Canfield, op. cit., p. 396.



## I. THE MISSION

Navy public relations must:

- 1- ascertain the attitudes of the public toward the Navy and seapower.
- 2- ascertain the level of knowledge the public has of seapower, the New Nuclear Navy, and the role of the Navy in implementing national policy.
- 3- instill in every individual in the Navy the true meaning of public relations and the benefits which they and the Navy can attain by the employment of public relations.
- 4- conduct a vigorous information program to educate the publics--internal, external and foreign--on the capabilities of the New Nuclear Navy.
- 5- inform the public of the advantages a naval career offers in the New Nuclear Navy.
- 6- examine policy made in the Navy for its public relations implications.

## II. IMPLEMENTATION

In any organization you've got to stop the big thoughts, you've got to stop the abstract thinking, and you've got to get down and produce some results.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Milton Fairman, Director of Public Relations, Borden Company, "What is Public Relations," A Public Relations Program (Pensacola: Naval Air Station, 1950), p. 16.



The first step in implementing the Navy's public relations program is "education." Each individual must be educated on what public relations is and how to use it. This can be done by word of mouth, by PIO's and by the written word.

There is currently a public information correspondence course. This should not be cancelled. Instead, it should be altered to contain the concept of public relations--including human relations.

The second step in implementation is to have an organization of "public relations" officers and enlisted men in the Navy. One of the most difficult problems to be overcome in carrying out the Navy's public relations program on a long-range basis is the shortage of qualified personnel. To do an effective job in this field, an officer must possess both a sound knowledge of naval operations and policies, and a thorough acquaintance with public relations techniques. Officers combining these qualities are in short supply.

The next problem an implementer faces is getting the word concerning the New Nuclear Navy to the public.

The most imaginative and skillful public relations counselor has his work cut out for him when he tries to convey to the American people either by word or picture the Navy's contribution to national security. The very nature of the fluid and complex maritime operations makes it difficult. For example, it is





hard to portray the true effectiveness of such a weapons system as the carrier task force. Its precision, complexity, and power must be seen to be appreciated.<sup>3</sup>

This could be stated "Just how are you going to explain the physical appearance, capability and need for a nuclear powered Forrestal aircraft carrier to a housewife in Box Elder, South Dakota?" Navy public relations faces the gigantic problem of translating into understandable terms the job the New Nuclear Navy is doing today and the greater job it will be doing tomorrow.

### III. SUMMARY

The mission of Navy public relations can be summed up as follows: educate and implement.

Educate the Navy, the American public, and foreign friends--and enemies. For the Navy, education is two-fold--educate them concerning public relations and concerning the New Nuclear Navy.

Implement the education program. Implement the conduct of the concept of public relations in all dealings with people.

One other quote of Admiral Carney concludes this chapter:

As far as the Navy of the present and future is concerned, it is obvious that if we are to retain our

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<sup>3</sup>Carney, "Military Public Relations," op. cit.



hard-won ranking as the world's number one sea power, we have more than a "doing" job; we have a "telling" job as well. And because of the crying need to develop new and better weapons, to recruit and train new people, to retain the good people we already have, to build new ships to keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of this new atomic era, we must take what effort and time is required to stay on an operating frequency with the people we serve.



## CHAPTER X

### CONCLUSIONS

#### I. RELATING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

What must be done to carry out the education and implementation necessary under the Navy's public relations program for the New Nuclear Navy?

This thesis reviewed the civilian public relations recommendations. At this point, in conclusion, these studies should be related to the new mission.

Perhaps of greatest importance is for the Navy to recognize "public relations" and to differentiate between public information and public relations. In line with this, the Navy should:

- 1- Create a new division entitled Office of Public Relations.

- 2- Make the present Chief of Information a Vice Admiral and designate him "Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Public Relations" and "Chief of Information."

- 3- Submit a separate budget for public relations.

- 4- Add a U. S. Navy Public Relations manual to the present U. S. Navy Public Information manual.

To have an effective public relations--and public information--program, the Navy must have a well trained, well qualified public relations corps. Otherwise it is a vicious circle. Poor public relations personnel do a poor



job, the program is a failure, new qualified personnel reject membership, the program gets worse, and finally, the Navy says the PR program is not accomplishing anything, let's abandon it. Therefore, the Navy should:

5- Create a strong, career-bound, public relations personnel corps, through offering suitable and appropriate incentives such as promotion and assignment to responsible duties.

6- Broaden public relations training in schools, in the fleet, in the shore establishment.

7- Ensure that all present PIO's are well grounded in the fundamentals of public relations.

The second area in which emphasis should be placed in the new public relations program is plans. This is closely tied in with public opinion surveys. The Navy must ascertain current public opinion on the various aspects of the Navy, and then plan to change--or reenforce these attitudes. They should:

8- Take--or have taken--frequent public opinion surveys on various subjects such as the role of the Navy in national defense, reenlistment, etc.

9- Commence a long-range, world-wide, Navy-wide public relations planning.

Third, the Navy must exercise public relations in every act it conducts. They must:

10- Employ public relations in all contacts with the public and the media.

11- Employ public relations in all contacts with foreign nationals.





12- Strengthen the Navy's community relations program. Show the New Nuclear Navy to the grassroots--either in person or via such media as television.

13- Strengthen internal relations such as the new habitability being incorporated into ships.

There are also some areas of Public Information which should be modified. To that end, it is recommended that the suggestions contained in this thesis be closely examined and, if possible, adopted.

The Navy's peacetime role should be stressed.

14- Publicity should be given to the peacetime accomplishments--other than the "showing the Flag" enforcing national policy. Such jobs as Antarctic expeditions, Naval Observatory work, naval medical research, rescue work, etc.

And finally, the Navy should seek out assistance from those civilian experts who would be only too willing to give guidance. They should:

15- Establish a Civilian Public Relations Advisory Board, to be composed of top-notch public relations experts--with Navy experience if possible--who would act as a Board of Visitors, evaluating the Navy's public relations program and lending advice and support.

## II. FURTHER AREAS TO BE INVESTIGATED

Certain aspects of Navy public relations were unexplainably avoided in the five reports studied in this thesis. It could not have been because they were unimportant because their importance is high.



A researcher, for example, should investigate the community relations problem regarding naval air stations. The Air Force lists this as their number one community relations problem--especially since jets have arrived on the scene.

Another area that bears investigation is the enlistment-reenlistment problem. Why does a man enlist in one service and not another? Why does one man reenlist and not another? What are the public relations problems connected with these answers?

Exercises and operations should be investigated for public information implications. Here is the one time that the working press get to see the Navy in full action. What are the attitudes and opinions of the media toward the conduct of these maneuvers? ...toward the handling of the press? ...toward the selling job the Navy does? ...toward the need for the New Nuclear Navy?

And, most importantly, what does the Navy PIO think about a career in the Navy? Is there any incentive for such a career--promotion, rank, responsible PIO assignments? Or, does the PIO feel that he can never attain status because he is not an unrestricted line officer--even if the status desired is in the public relations field?



Lastly, why not have a study made of Navy public relations and public information--not by a civilian expert, not by a regular Navy line officer--but by a regular Navy public information specialist. The latter may be the best qualified. He knows the Navy, he knows public relations, he knows why some concepts will work in the Navy and why others won't. He knows how to solve the problems. Let the PIO do a survey and then let him implement his recommendations. The results might be surprising.

There is one last fact that this study brought out which should be mentioned.

It is often said that many officers shy away from public information duty, would take any assignment but that of a PIO. It is felt that such duty drives a nail in the coffin of their career.

It is interesting to note that those who have foreseen the potential of public relations--and in some cases been "pioneers" in military public relations, have not had their careers stifled. In fact, they made out rather well:

1916- first Army press release officer --  
General Douglas MacArthur.

1927- first officer to send press reports ashore  
during naval battle maneuvers -- Admiral Robert B. Carney.

1935- Chief of the Information Division in the office  
of Chief of Air Service, War Department --  
General Hap Arnold.

1946- Director of Information, War Department --  
General J. Lawton Collins.



### III. IN RETROSPECT

The Navy public relations program of 1958 has made incomparable strides over the program of twenty years ago, as have naval weapons. As the latter expand visibly from day to day, it is hoped that naval public relations will expand. That in one year, more will be accomplished than was accomplished in a decade.

Navy public relations will skyrocket ahead with the New Nuclear Navy--the result will be a better Navy, a stronger Navy, a more effective Navy--not only in the material things, but in the human abstractions.





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## APPENDIX A

### PUBLIC RELATIONS MISSIONS OF THE ARMY, AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS

#### I. ARMY

The United States Army has an obligation to report on its activities to the American people. In order that they be continuously informed of the activities and accomplishments of the Army, it is essential that, consistent with military security, the American people be given factual information relating to the--

(1) missions and objectives of the Army and their support of national aims.

(2) programs and accomplishments of the Army, in the United States and overseas areas.

(3) utilization of funds appropriated by Congress.

(4) continuous effort of the Army to provide weapons, weapons systems, training, equipment, methods, and techniques having a margin of superiority which will assure success in battle.

(5) necessity for maintaining an Army of sufficient strength to meet the requirements of national security, including oversea commitments.

(6) relationship of the Army to the American people.

(7) present and future requirements of the Army in men, money and materials.

(8) role of the Army in relation to the other services in protecting the nation.

(9) identification of leaders and accomplishments of individuals and units.



(10) activities in the public interest, to include resulting public benefits.

(11) opportunities for advancement, individual development, and financial security afforded by the Army.

(12) the role of the reserve components in national defense and their need for continuous public support, particularly at the community level.

In accomplishing these objectives, sound principles of community relations, press relations, and public relations will be observed. Commanders will take cognizance of the fact that publicity is only one element of any public relations program and will insure that members of their commands fully realize that each member of the Army shares in responsibility for individual maintenance of public confidence and support. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that such things as good human relations, good performance and an individual code of honorable conduct form the foundation of favorable public opinion.<sup>1</sup>

## AIR FORCE

To fulfill the requirements imposed by our obligations to the American people and to the personnel of the Air Force, the information program is dedicated to the following over-all objectives:

1. To attain universal comprehension of the nature of the threat endangering the security of the United States and the free world.

2. To develop a program designed to give every member of the Air Force an understanding of airpower.

3. To insure consistency of expression by the Air Force personnel on matters of policy, doctrine, and concept when acting in an official capacity with the public.

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<sup>1</sup>Public Information--General Policies, Department of the Army, Army Regulations No. 360-5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 12-13.



4. To explain to the American public the manner in which the Air Force can efficiently cope with the demands of national security in periods of tension and in global war.

5. To provide Air Force personnel and the American people with an understanding of the dominant role of airpower in international relations, particularly an appreciation of the role of United States airpower in United States foreign relations.

6. To promote an understanding of the fundamentals of modern war. The information services program operates within three major areas of activity to accomplish the objectives outlined above: Internal information, public information and community relations.<sup>2</sup>

### MARINE CORPS

1. The information services mission of the Marine Corps is to:

a. Keep the public informed:

(1) of Marine Corps missions, organization and performance of assigned tasks.

(2) in support of personnel procurement.

b. Keep Marines informed:

(1) of the nature of service in the Corps.

(2) of the activities of the Corps and of the command to which attached.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Air Force Information Services Manual (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1956), pp. 1-2.

<sup>3</sup>U. S. Marine Corps Informational Services Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 1-2.



## APPENDIX B

### RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIVISIONS

#### OFFICE OF INFORMATION, NAVY DEPARTMENT

##### Chief of Information

The Chief of Information is designated as the direct representative of the Secretary of the Navy and of the Chief of Naval Operations in all matters of public information. As such, he shall be consulted concerning the public information aspects of proposed naval plans and policies.

In exercising this responsibility the Chief of Information shall:

(a) Advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations on matters of policy relating to public understanding and support of the Navy; on policies and methods relative to public relations and dissemination of information; on public information aspects of operations and activities.

(b) Coordinate the public information policies and programs of the Navy and Marine Corps.

(c) Impart to the personnel of the Navy, including the reserve components thereof, appropriate information on current policies and programs of the Navy Department.

(d) Promulgate instructions as necessary and appropriate for the conduct and implementation of public information programs throughout the Naval Establishment.

(e) Collect, evaluate, coordinate and disseminate information of national importance originating within the fleet commands and the Shore Establishment.

(f) Originate and disseminate, through proper channels, information material developing within the Navy Department.

(g) Coordinate and develop channels between the Navy and the public for accomplishment of the Navy's mission.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 7.





## Deputy Chief of Information

The Deputy Chief of Information is the principle assistant to the Chief of Information, and will act as his deputy and chief of staff. He will coordinate the activities of the component divisions and offices of the Office of Information.

## Special Deputy

The Special Deputy is responsible to the Chief of Information for such information projects and programs as may be assigned.

## Planning Division

The Planning Division is an advisory and coordinating group which will formulate public information plans and policies; conduct research, and study of public relations and problems and maintain liaison with the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps on public information policy matters.

## Administrative Division

The Administrative Division will administer the Office of Information in a manner which will facilitate the effective and expeditious conduct of business in that office; insure that classified mail and files are handled in accordance with existing regulations; prepare and maintain budgetary records on all public information activities of the Navy, and coordinate the assignment and rotation of public information personnel.

## Public Information Division

The Public Information Division will originate and disseminate Navy Department information material through authorized channels; answer queries emanating from all public media and government agencies; maintain operational liaison with the Media Divisions, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense; arrange and process authorization, accreditation and travel of media correspondents; make arrangements for special events of interest to media.



### Civil Relations Division

The Civil Relations Division will administer the Navy Community Relations Program and the Navy Guest Cruise Program; coordinate special orientation visits of individual civilians or groups to naval installations; maintain liaison with and conduct programs of cooperation with all civilian groups and nongovernmental agencies which do not fall within the category of public information media, and answer queries emanating from the general public.

### Internal Relations Division

The Internal Relations Division will effect appropriate liaison and coordination with the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, and between the Department and all commands afloat and ashore, other government agencies, and with the Army and Air Force on other than policy matters; assemble and disseminate public information policies, programs and material originating within the Navy Department to all naval personnel; and, plan and administer the Volunteer Reserve Public Relations Program. (Now known as Naval Reserve Public Relations Program.)<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14.



## APPENDIX C

### ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATION ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

Pay and allowances of all personnel, including secretarial and clerical, both military and civilian, engaged in the activities indicated below, are included in the limitation on funds expendable for public information and public relations as imposed by Congress. The applicable share of pay and allowances of personnel engaged in this work on a part-time basis will also be included.

For the purpose of costing, and except as excluded below, public information and public relations activities include:

(1) preparation of material (whether voluntary or upon specific request) for distribution to, and official contacts with representatives of, non-governmental publications.

(2) preparation of material (whether voluntary or upon specific request) for radio and television broadcasting purposes, and official contacts with broadcasting representatives.

(3) preparation and publication of advertisements in any form whether paid or free.

(4) preparation, installation, presentation and circulation (including packing, crating and transporting) of exhibits, except those for internal use, procurement purposes, or civilian contractor plant morale and incentive purposes.

(5) production and presentation of motion pictures and film strips, except those for internal use within the Government.

(6) preparation and printing of publications other than those required by law or those issued primarily for internal use in the Government.



The following activities are excluded:

(1) time of civilian and military officials (other than those having public information or public relations as a specific responsibility) who, by virtue of their offices, are called upon to participate in such activities.

(2) time of personnel devoted to such matters as accounting, personnel records, or supply for public information or public relations activities.

(3) time of personnel whose work is devoted to publications required by law, or those primarily for use within the Government.

(4) answering correspondence and inquiries from the public, or participating in meetings intended to answer questions from the public.

(5) issuance of interpretations of regulations, orders issued under the Administrative Procedures Act, etc.

(6) time of personnel at "open-house" presentations at military installations, participating in parades, musical concerts and demonstrations.

(7) advertisements, exhibits, films, film strips or publications relating to acquisition of government property, or recruitment or employment of government personnel.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Office of Information, Navy Department, Administration of funds for public information and public relations activities, Report Symbol EXOS 7330-2, CHINFO Instruction 7330.1C (Washington: Defense Printing Office, 1957), pp. 2-3.













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